
**Information technology — Guide
to on-card biometric comparison
standards and applications**

*Technologies de l'information — Guide des normes et applications de
comparaison biométrique sur carte*

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).

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For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information

The committee responsible for this document is ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology, SC 17, Cards and personal identification*.

Introduction

There are a large number of applications where the need of implementing jointly integrated circuit cards – ICC (i.e. smart cards) and biometrics can arise. In those cases, system designers and integrators have to be aware of the whole range of international standards and technical reports that may be applicable. All these potential reference documents have been developed by different standardization bodies and different subcommittees. For example, those standards dealing with ICCs are defined within ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17, while those dealing with biometrics are developed in ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37. Furthermore, when security aspects are to be considered, the works in ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 have to be referenced.

In this context, the system designer and developer have in their hands a large number of documents, and on some occasions little information about which of them are really applicable to the application to be developed, and which alternatives can be faced.

This Technical Report provides a guide to those developers by enumerating and referring to those published standards and reports, relating them to the kind of application to be developed. When referring to different applications, these will be classified attending to the authentication needs of the application, not to the final sector where the application is to be deployed.

Interactions among standards cover different implementation levels, from data formats to be used to the application profiles, including application programming interfaces (APIs) and security mechanisms.

This Technical Report places special emphasis on providing recommendations and policies needed by developers to integrate applications related to on-card biometric comparison.

The structure of this Technical Report is as follows.

- [Clause 4](#) provides a first overview to the different decisions that have to be taken when developing an application that may involve the use of ICCs and biometrics.
- [Clauses 5](#) to [9](#) provide an overview to the different International Standards and Technical Reports that may be applicable to the application to be developed.
- [Clause 10](#) will provide examples of implementations that may be used by application designers and developers as guidelines.

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Information technology — Guide to on-card biometric comparison standards and applications

1 Scope

This Technical Report summarizes how the international standards, recommendations and technical reports dealing with identification cards, biometrics and/or information security relate to each other with regard to the joint use of biometrics and integrated circuit cards. It also provides further recommendations and policies needed by developers to integrate applications related to on-card biometric comparison.

2 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

2.1

biometric probe

biometric query

biometric sample or biometric feature set input to an algorithm for use as the subject of biometric comparison to a biometric reference(s)

Note 1 to entry: The term comparison refers to comparison in the biometric sense.

Note 2 to entry: The subject/object labelling in a comparison might be arbitrary. In some comparisons a biometric reference might be used as the subject of the comparison with other biometric references or incoming samples used as the objects of the comparisons. For example, in a duplicate enrolment check a biometric reference will be used as the subject for comparison against all other biometric references in the database.

Note 3 to entry: Typically in a biometric comparison process, incoming biometric samples serve as the subject of comparison against objects stored as biometric references in a database.

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012]

Note 4 to entry: In the scope of ISO/IEC 7816-11, these two terms are used under the more generalized term of “biometric verification data”.

2.2

biometric reference

one or more stored biometric samples, biometric templates or biometric models attributed to a biometric data subject and used as the object of biometric comparison

EXAMPLE Face image stored digitally on a passport; Fingerprint minutiae template on a National ID card; Gaussian Mixture Model for speaker recognition, in a database.

Note 1 to entry: A biometric reference may be created with implicit or explicit use of auxiliary data, such as Universal Background Models.

Note 2 to entry: The subject/object labelling in a comparison might be arbitrary. In some comparisons a biometric reference might be used as the subject of the comparison with other biometric references or incoming samples used as the objects of the comparisons. For example, in a duplicate enrolment check a biometric reference will be used as the subject for comparison against all other biometric references in the database.

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012]

Note 3 to entry: In the scope of ISO/IEC 7816-11, this term is used under the more generalized term of “biometric reference data”.

2.3

biometric feature

numbers or labels extracted from biometric samples and used for comparison

Note 1 to entry: Biometric features are the output of a completed biometric feature extraction.

Note 2 to entry: The use of this term should be consistent with its use by the pattern recognition and mathematics communities.

Note 3 to entry: A biometric feature set can also be considered a processed biometric sample.

Note 4 to entry: Biometric features may be extracted from an intermediate biometric sample.

Note 5 to entry: Filters applied to biometric samples are not themselves biometric features, however the output of the filter applied to these samples may be. Therefore, for example, eigenfaces are not biometric

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012]

2.4

biometric sample

analog or digital representation of biometric characteristics prior to biometric feature extraction

EXAMPLE A record containing the image of a finger is a biometric sample.

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012]

2.5

biometric template

set of stored biometric features comparable directly to probe biometric features

Note 1 to entry: In the scope of ISO/IEC 7816, the term template has a completely different meaning, being in that case the "value field of a constructed data object", no matter if the data object relates to biometrics or not.

2.6

intermediate biometric sample/probe

biometric sample/probe resulting from intermediate biometric sample processing

EXAMPLE Biometric samples that have been cropped, down-sampled, compressed or enhanced are examples of intermediate biometric samples.

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012]

2.7

intermediate biometric sample processing

any manipulation of a biometric sample that does not produce biometric features

EXAMPLE Examples of intermediate biometric sample processing include cropping, down-sampling, compression, conversion to data interchange formats standard and image enhancement.

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012]

2.8

processed sample/probe

biometric sample/probe resulting from biometric sample processing that is ready to be used for storage as a biometric reference, or to be compared with a previous biometric reference

EXAMPLE Fingerprint minutiae or iris codes are examples of processed biometric samples.

2.9

captured biometric sample

raw biometric sample (deprecated)

biometric sample resulting from a biometric capture process

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012]

3 Symbols and abbreviated terms

API	Application Program Interface
BIR	Biometric Information Record
CBEFF	Common Biometric Exchange Format Framework
ICC	Integrated Circuit Card
IFD	Interface Device
SB	Security Block, as defined in CBEFF standard ISO/IEC 19785-1
COS	Card Operating System

4 Relationships between biometrics and ICCs

ISO/IEC 24787^[16] provides a comprehensive introduction to the different ways that biometrics and ICCs can be integrated into a final application. This is summarized as follows as to provide a brief introduction to the reader of this Technical Report. When integrating biometrics into ICCs, four different approaches can be followed:

- Store on card: In this case, the ICC is used to store the biometric reference. The application will read from the ICC the biometric reference, as needed, and execute all the authentication process within the IFD or rest of the system. The COS has no extra control on the biometric data, apart from using the same kind of mechanisms that when storing any other kind of data into the ICC.
- On-card biometric comparison: In this approach the ICC not only stores the biometric reference, but also performs the biometric comparison inside the card, once an external biometric probe has been received by the ICC. With this approach, the COS can use the same control with the biometric reference, as with those administrative keys stored in the card (e.g. not allowing the reading of the biometric reference, controlling the number of consecutive unsuccessful comparisons carried out, blocking the authentication mechanism if a certain number of consecutive unsuccessful comparisons is reached, etc.). Also the COS can control de access to other information in the card, or commands within the card, considering the result of a previous on-card biometric comparison. In this technology the biometric probe is usually considered to be a biometric feature set, instead of a raw sample.
- Work-sharing mechanism for on-card biometric comparison: the previous approach may not be able to be fully integrated into the ICC due to several reasons, being the most frequent, the lack of processing capabilities of the ICC. In such a case, it might be possible that part of the process is executed in the IFD or system, and the results transmitted to the ICC to end the comparison process. Although this is initially defined for sharing the work on the comparison algorithm, this same schema can be used for the pre-processing and the feature extraction phases of the biometric process. In the former case, the biometric probe to be sent to the card is to be a biometric feature set, while in the latter case the biometric probe can be a raw sample, an intermediate sample or a processed sample.
- System-on-Card: this approach is based on the inclusion of all the steps of the biometric process within the ICC, including the sample acquisition, i.e. the sensor is embedded into the ICC. Due to this definition, only certain modalities can be considered with the technology existing nowadays, being restricted to those where the sensor is small and flexible as to allow the ICC to pass the physical and mechanical test methods defined in ISO/IEC 10373-1. If the physical restrictions are removed and other kind of embodiments are selected (keeping conformance to the rest of applicable ICC standards), then the number of biometric modalities can be increased.

With these initial concepts, the application designer or developer is to take several decisions as to define the whole system and the relationship to be established between biometrics and ICCs. The following

decision tree is provided for illustration purposes, where the subsequent clauses in this Technical Report are referenced.

- a) Is the system going to be implementing an authentication scheme (i.e. the user claims his/her identity and the comparison is only made between the sample provided and the biometric reference of the claimed user), or an identification scheme (i.e. the biometric sample is to be compared to the whole database of users enrolled)?
 - 1) If an identification scheme is used, then there is no need to a further relationship between biometrics and ICCs, and in such case this Technical Report is not applicable.
- b) Is the system considering the use of a centralized database, or is it going to be implemented in a distributed way?
 - 1) If a centralized database is going to be used and such database is going to be contacted at every single authentication attempt, then the need of further relationship between biometric information and ICC is not needed. Therefore this Technical Report is not applicable. The ICC will act only as a mean to claim the user identity.
- c) Is there an initial requirement of the biometric modality to be used?
 - 1) With an initial requirement, a set of further decisions may be already taken, such as the possibility of using on-card biometric comparison, work-sharing or system-on-card.
 - 2) If there is no initial requirement the decision on the modality can be taken as any other requirements are satisfied.
 - 3) Once the modality is chosen, then the interoperable data formats have to be checked (see [Clause 5](#))
- d) Which are the initial cost requirements?
 - 1) If there is the requirement of using low cost ICCs, then alternatives such as on-card biometric comparison, work-sharing or system-on-card can be compromised.
 - 2) Furthermore if storage capacity is impacting the ICC cost, then the number of references to be stored on the card, or the modalities to be used can be limited and/or the use of compact data formats may become a major requirement (see [Clause 5](#)).
- e) Which are the needs for interoperability?
 - 1) If there is no need, then the designer may decide to create his/her own solution without following any standard. Therefore this Technical Report may not be applicable. This option is not recommended as the need for interoperability may arise at any time during the project, or when applying the development done for the current project to future ones.
 - 2) If interoperability is required for exchanging data, then refer to [Clause 5](#). As it will be seen, it may happen that for reaching global interoperability, being independent on the algorithm to be used, the use of raw sample data formats may become the only viable solution.
 - 3) If interoperability is required to have multiple technological providers, then not only data interoperability is requested, but also interoperability at API level and from security mechanisms. See [Clauses 6](#) and [7](#).
 - 4) The use of more complex products, such as on-card biometric comparison ones or System-on-Card, contributes to reach interoperability, as there is only the need to focus on data interoperability (and may be security mechanisms), avoiding all technological differences coming from technological solutions at algorithm level.
- f) In many parts of the world, biometric data are considered as personal data, and therefore are to be protected, as to ensure citizen's privacy. Depending on the environment where the application is

going to be deployed, the use of security mechanisms becomes a major requirement. See [Clause 6](#) for the works already done in this area.

- g) The most typical scenario for designing and developing a new project involving ICCs and biometrics, is integrating technological modules from several providers. Furthermore, many project designers require more than one provider for each technological module to be integrated. In this kind of scenarios, standardized APIs are to be used to ease integration. [Clause 7](#) provides further details.
- h) For certain applications there is the need of following already defined specifications. [Clause 8](#) will describe the current available specifications.
- i) Last but not least, either to select the technological modules to be integrated, or to provide final results to the end user about the behaviour of the whole project, evaluation methodology is required. [Clause 9](#) will describe the evaluation-related standards related to ICC, biometrics and security.

In addition to all this information, [Clause 9](#) provide guidance for implementing on-card biometric comparison solutions, based, or not, on ISO/IEC 24787.^[16]

5 Data Formats

ICC related standards do not provide serious constraints about the format of the data to be exchanged and/or stored. As long as these data are encapsulated within the ICC protocol and COS specification (i.e. following ISO/IEC 7816-4^[2], ISO/IEC 7816-6^[3], ISO/IEC 7816-8^[4] and ISO/IEC 7816-9^[5], and the manufacturer's restriction to the COS implemented in the ICC), the only standards to be considered for data formats are the ones related to biometrics.

ISO/IEC 19794^[11] series of International Standards provide interoperable ways to code biometric data, depending on the modality. This multipart standard provides a framework to be applied to all parts, some data formats for raw sample data (e.g. sample images), and some others for processed sample data (e.g. fingerprint minutiae). This family of standards have currently two different generations defined, that are both still accepted. The first generation of standards is the one published in 2005–2007, and it has been requested to be kept available by ISO/IEC to keep compliance with the standards of some world-wide applications, such as the ePassport. But for new project it is recommended that the second generation of these standards is followed. This generation is composed of those standards being published in 2011 and beyond this date.

The second generation of ISO/IEC 19794^[11] is a multipart standard with the following structure:

- Part 1 provides a general framework to be applied to all the other parts. It defines the general structure for the biometric records and the common elements of such structure. It tells that each biometric information record (BIR) is to be composed of a general header that introduces the information to be followed, and one or more representations (i.e. biometric samples), which are structured into a representation header and the representation data. Part 1 defines those common elements of each of the headers. This is defined for both, a binary coding and an XML coding. In addition to this, it also defines the framework for the conformance testing of those BIRs defined within this family of standards.
- Part 2-n provide the information about those extra elements to be added to the different headers, plus the way the representation data are to be coded. This is done for each of the modalities defined. Up to date, the ISO/IEC 19794^[11] series of standards defined the following modalities:
 - Part 2: finger minutiae
 - Part 4: finger image
 - Part 5: face image
 - Part 6: iris image
 - Part 7: handwritten signature time series

- Part 8: finger skeletal data
- Part 9: vascular image
- Part 11: handwritten signature processed data
- Part 13: voice data
- Part 14: DNA data

For some of these modalities, more than one format is defined, including a compact representation, also known as card format. Such card format is intended to reduce storage and communication needs for certain applications, such as the ones of on-card biometric comparison. The main idea behind those card formats is to reduce the size by removing many of the fields at the general header or representation header. This is possible because if a data record is transmitted to an ICC, then its application contour conditions are fixed and many of those fields are not needed.

In addition to record and card formats, there is also, within the 2nd generation of ISO/IEC 19794[11] standards, a new set of amendments is being defined for allowing a XML coding of the information. Currently most of the parts are defining XML coding, and even there are two parts (ISO/IEC 19794-13 and ISO/IEC 19794-14) that have been initially specified in XML.

In addition to the data formats defined in ISO/IEC 19794[11] which are defined as to include the information from a single user and a single modality, ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 has also defined a meta-structure called CBEFF (i.e. ISO/IEC 19785[9] series of standards), that allows:

- the coding of biometric information from more than a single user;
- the coding of biometric information from more than one modality; and
- protecting biometric data by using security mechanisms that may cipher and authenticate the data included into the record.

A CBEFF record is composed of a

- header that introduces to the information embedded into the record;
- the biometric data, which can be a BIR as defined in ISO/IEC 19794[11]; and
- an optional security block (SB) that embeds that data needed for protecting the biometric information.

CBEFF also allows the existence a hierarchical approach that is able to embed multiple simple CBEFF records in what is called as a complex CBEFF record.

The way that CBEFF records can be coded can change from one architecture to another. This is why ISO/IEC 19785-3 defines several ways to code CBEFF records in what is called as patron formats. These patron formats for binary coding, with different system word lengths, XML coding or ASN.1 coding. One of the binary coding is defined as to be the best suitable option for ICCs, especially when using on-card biometric comparison approaches.

ISO/IEC 7816-11[6] defines how to use biometric information in ICCs, by defining a Biometric Information Template frame (see Clause 5 and Annex C of ISO/IEC 7816-11). The coding inside the frame is defined in Clause 11 of ISO/IEC 19785-3, .

6 Security mechanisms

Biometric data are considered in many scenarios as personal data, and protection of such data is required. As already mentioned, CBEFF (i.e. ISO/IEC 19785[9]) defines a security block (SB) to hold information for protecting the biometric data (e.g. cryptograms that will provide integrity and authentication mechanisms). But in order to reach interoperability the international standards and reports defined

within ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 have to be considered. SC27 covers the security and privacy in all Information Technology fields, but related to biometrics, the major works carried out are:

- Dealing with application design and security and privacy scenarios the following works are initiated, which will be further referenced in [Clause 8](#):
 - ISO/IEC 29100[17] on Privacy Framework
 - ISO/IEC 29101[18] on the Privacy Reference Architecture
 - ISO/IEC 29146[20] on A Framework for Access Management
 - ISO/IEC 24760 on A Framework for Identity Management
 - ISO/IEC 29115[19] on Entity Authentication Assurance Framework
 - ISO/IEC 29191[24] on Requirements on Relative Anonymity with Identity Escrow
 - ISO/IEC 29190[23] on Privacy Capability Maturity Model
- ISO/IEC 19792[10] on Security Evaluation of Biometrics, to be referenced in [Clause 9](#).
- ISO/IEC 24761[15] on Access Conditions for Biometrics (ACBio). This International Standard specifies the way that security mechanisms are to be used, and how information is to be coded into the SB.
- ISO/IEC 24745[13] on Biometric Information Protection, which specifies the way biometric information can be used to achieve cancellable biometric references, i.e. what is also known in the industry as “biometric template protection”.

In addition to these works, SC37 has also two projects related to security in biometrics. The first one is ISO/IEC TR 29156[21] about Requirements for reaching Security and Usability in Biometrics. The second one is ISO/IEC 30107[26] about Presentation Attack Detection Mechanisms. These projects present an excellent complement to the works done in SC27.

Going down to the ICC level, SC17 defines security mechanisms to be used within ICCs, such as Secure Messaging or the way that secret keys have to be handled by the COS. ISO/IEC 7816-4[2] and ISO/IEC 7816-8[5] provide such specifications. Regarding on-card biometric comparison, ISO/IEC 24787[16] defines some security requirements for this technology.

The methods outlined in this clause can be implemented in a variety of ways. It is out of the scope of this Technical Report to define those implementations. Such implementations are to be defined at specific profiles related to the final application targeted.

The developer of an on-card biometric comparison related application may be interested in considering other security related standards, such as the ones defined in ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27.

7 Application development

Developing an application involving ICCs and biometrics, usually needs the integration of several modules. In order to ease that integration, the use of standardized Application Program Interfaces (API) is recommended. Biometric applications and modules may be developed using BioAPI, which is specified in the multipart standard ISO/IEC 19784,[8] where ISO/IEC 19784-1 is the main definition of the API. BioAPI in its initial definition is based on a framework that interconnects the different modules, which are developed as Biometric Service Providers (BSPs), which may be composed of units (algorithms, sensor or archive units), and/or Biometric Function Providers (BFPs) that group units. Within ISO/IEC 19784-1 there is also the possibility of implementing a framework free version of BioAPI, as to allow its deployment in devices with operating system but limited processing capabilities.

BioAPI is specified in C language, which causes it to lack an object oriented approach to its implementation. In order to overcome this inconvenience, ISO/IEC 30106[25] provides a specification of an object oriented BioAPI that is composed of a general framework with an UML description (ISO/IEC 30106-1), a Java

language reference implementation (ISO/IEC 30106-2) and a C# language reference implementation (ISO/IEC 30106-3).

Within a BioAPI structured product, an on-card biometric comparison ICC will be another biometric service provided to the system, i.e. it is a BSP. In this case, the BSP is providing two main functionalities: storage and comparison, although from the storage functionality, only storage is provided and no reading of the information is allowed. In those cases when an off-card biometric comparison ICC is used, then the ICC will be provided as another BSP, but in such case the BSP is only providing support for storage (and reading) capabilities.

If the application is expected to be implemented using a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), then ISO/IEC 30108^[22] should be referenced, as it defines BIAS (Biometric Identity Assurance Services).

When the application is intended to be developed under low cost, low performance devices, such as embedded systems, a simplified version of BioAPI is defined in ISO/IEC 29164^[22] called Embedded BioAPI.

8 Application profiles

There are several standards and technical reports published, that should be a reference for a system designer and/or developer, when defining certain applications. This is the case as those standards developed under the umbrella of ISO/IEC JTC1/SC37 WG6, in charge of developing specifications for those jurisdictional and social issues around the use of biometrics. Another case may be the works carried out by CEN TC224 WG6 devoted to define user interfacing in ID applications within Europe

Specifically, considering the technology of on-card biometric comparison, there are some multi-national, national or even sector-restricted specifications that refer to this technology. Some examples of this kind of specifications are:

- European Citizen Card (CEN/TS 15480), developed by CEN TC224, specifies the requirements for a citizen card, that includes not only the physical identity verification, but also the electronic identity of the citizen. Within its specifications it allows to implement the citizen card using on-card biometric comparison products. This specification has already been followed by several countries in Europe, to issue their National ID Cards, and some of them (e.g. Spain) have included on-card biometric comparison.
- Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201, *Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors*, provides requirements for a government-wide interoperable identity credential for issuance and use by United States (US) Federal Government employees and contractors. This US standard defines on-card biometric comparison as an optional mechanism for card activation and user authentication. Agencies that implement this option enable cardholders to present their biometrics to activate the PIV Card instead of using the PIN. Moreover, the use of the on-card biometric comparison as an authentication mechanism (named OCC_AUTH), enables relying systems to achieve a high assurance level multi-factor user authentication.

9 Technology evaluation

In addition to all the above documents, it is of major importance knowing which standards and reports have been developed to test the technology involving ICCs and biometrics. Starting with the ICCs-based test methods, ISO/IEC 10373^[7] family of standards define the test methods for all technological specifications of identification cards, including ICCs cards, both cards with contacts and contactless.

ISO/IEC JTC1/SC37 has a whole WG for developing standards and reports dealing with the evaluation of biometrics (WG5), and among all different projects carried on in such WG, it is of major importance the ISO/IEC 19795 multipart standard, which defines the principles for the evaluation of biometrics, plus some specific application of those principles to certain scenarios. One of those scenarios is the on-card biometric comparison. In ISO/IEC 19795-7^[12] a methodology for evaluating how different behaves a biometric solution when it is implemented inside a card, or when it is implemented in a conventional computer, is provided. This standard came out as a result of the MINEX-II evaluation that NIST initiated

to evaluate the level of performance of the on-card biometric comparison, with the idea of deciding if such a technology was suitable for being implemented into an identification card system. It is important to highlight that ISO/IEC 19795-7 does not evaluate the algorithm performance. A ISO/IEC 19795-7 evaluation searches for the confirmation that the accuracy of the algorithm executed inside the ICC, is the same as the accuracy of such algorithm being executed in a computer. In addition to such evaluation, a technology evaluation on the algorithm version over a PC can be performed (following ISO/IEC 19795-1 and ISO/IEC 19795-2). It is also important to note that in order to ease the evaluation process the cards will have to provide information about the comparison result, which is usually not available in commercial products to avoid hill climbing attacks.

In order to evaluate the security level achieved with the developed solution, Common Criteria is the major reference. The works in Common Criteria are subsequently standardized under ISO/IEC 15408. Dealing with biometrics, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 has developed the ISO/IEC 19792^[10] standard that specifies a methodology for evaluating security in biometric systems. Within Common Criteria Portal (<http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/>) there are some Protection Profiles (PPs) and Security Targets (STs) that are applicable to on-card biometric comparison products, and in the future, some PPs and/or STs may appear being specific to this technology.

10 Implementing on-card biometric comparison solutions

10.1 Spanish National ID Card (DNle)

10.1.1 Introduction

Spain has a long tradition with using National ID Cards, dating from the first half of the 20th century. The card (also known as DNI from Documento Nacional de Identidad) used to be a laminated paper-based document with physical security mechanisms. The card may be used at any time for proving the cardholder identity, and it is even accepted as a travel document within the Schengen area.

From that basis, the Spanish government decided to improve the document adding electronic ID capabilities through the incorporation of PKI-based key pairs within the document. Therefore it was decided to change the technology to an ICC-based document, with both electronic and physical protections, as to allow both, the face-to-face identification of the cardholder, and the electronic authentication and signature mechanisms for remote identification.

When defining the new generation of the Spanish National ID Card (also known as DNle for being the electronic version of the traditional DNI), it was decided to add on-card biometric comparison capabilities to the card.

In the following subsections the details of such implementation are provided.

10.1.2 Biometric services provided

The on-card biometric comparison supplements the secure access to certain resources embedded in the ICC of the DNle. These resources are:

- Electronic signature keys
- Authentication keys
- Electronic signature certificate
- Authentication certificate
- Certificates for the intermediate Certification Authority (CA)
- Cardholder's affiliation data
- Cardholder's handwritten signature image

- Cardholder's facial image

Due to the access conditions defined, currently the on-card biometric comparison mechanism is only available for the citizen at police stations to perform the following operations:

- Identity verification
- Unblocking PIN code
- Change of PIN code

10.1.3 Biometric modality and data formats

The biometric modality chosen for the DNIE is fingerprint. The DNIE is capable of verifying the identity by using any of the two index fingers of the cardholder. Therefore the following specifications were placed for the system:

- During enrolment, rolled fingerprints of both index fingers are taken, accepting them after a quality threshold has been successfully passed.
- At the verification stage, the cardholder inserts the card and when prompted by the application, place the requested index finger on a plain fingerprint sensor. The minutiae are extracted, coded following ISO/IEC 19794-2:2011 card format, and sent to the ICC in a secure way. Then the ICC compares those minutiae with the ones stored at the ICC, and a decision is taken. If the comparison is successful, an OK feedback is provided. If not, a NO-OK feedback is given. No further information is provided from the comparison in order to avoid hill climbing attacks.

10.1.4 Security mechanisms and operations

In order to use the biometric identity verification mechanism, the access conditions are based in a previous establishment of a Secure Administrative Channel. This is due to the fact that the Certification Bodies currently do not accept fingerprint biometrics as a strong authentication mechanism. Using strong security mechanisms is a requirement for obtaining an EAL4+ certification under Common Criteria. At the same time, that is also a requirement for the DNIE, as it has to be considered as a Secure Signature Creation Device, under the European legislation.

Therefore the solution was to protect the use of the on-card biometric comparison mechanism, by using previously a verification of other key(s), for which the validation algorithm can be considered as strong.

Several operations within the card have an involvement within the biometric verification:

- RSA Keys renewal: biometrics + PIN + Secure Administrative Channel
- Certificates renewal: biometrics + PIN + Secure Administrative Channel
- Unblocking the PIN code: there is not a PIN unblocking key (PUK) mechanism, but the unblocking is performed by the combination of:
 - biometrics,
 - Secure Administrative Channel, and
 - a diversified administrative application key that ensures that the whole process is performed within a controlled and secure environment defined by the Spanish Police.
- Change of the PIN code: if the PIN is not blocked, it can be changed by any of the following access conditions combinations:
 - current PIN code + Secure Administrative Channel, or
 - biometrics + Secure Administrative Channel + diversified administrative application key