
**Information technology — Security
techniques — Digital signatures with
appendix —**

**Part 3:
Discrete logarithm based mechanisms**

**AMENDMENT 1: Elliptic Curve Russian
Digital Signature Algorithm, Schnorr Digital
Signature Algorithm, Elliptic Curve Schnorr
Digital Signature Algorithm, and Elliptic
Curve Full Schnorr Digital Signature
Algorithm**

*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Signatures
numériques avec appendice —*

Partie 3: Mécanismes basés sur un logarithme discret

*AMENDEMENT 1: Algorithme de signature numérique russe de courbe
elliptique, algorithme de signature numérique schnorr, algorithme de
signature numérique schnorr de courbe elliptique, et algorithme de
signature numérique schnorr totale de courbe elliptique*

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Foreword

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International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

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Amendment 1 to ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *IT Security techniques*.

Amendment 1 to ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006 introduces four digital signature algorithms: Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-RDSA), Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm (SDSA), Elliptic Curve Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-SDSA), and Elliptic Curve Full Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-FSDSA). Object identifiers, test vectors, a comparison of certificate-based mechanisms, and claimed features for choosing a mechanism are given.

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Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signatures with appendix —

Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms

AMENDMENT 1: Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm, Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm, Elliptic Curve Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm, and Elliptic Curve Full Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm

Page 1, Clause 2

In the second normative reference, replace “1998” with “2008”.

Page 3, Clause 4

Add the following to the end of the list of symbols:

Π_Y	y-value of Π
F	a finite field
F_p	a finite field of prime order p
Z_p^*	a multiplicative group over F_p

Page 27, Clause 6

Add the following subclauses after 6.6.4.6:

6.7 EC-RDSA

6.7.1 Introduction to EC-RDSA

EC-RDSA (Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm) is a signature mechanism with verification key $Y = [X]G$; that is, the parameter D is equal to 1. The message is prepared such that M_1 is empty and M_2 is the message to be signed, i.e., $M_2 = M$. The coefficients (A, B, C) of the EC-RDSA signature equation are set as follows:

$$(A, B, C) = (T_1, T_2, -S),$$

where $(T_1, T_2) = (H, R)$ and $H = h(M)$ is the hash-code of message M , converted to an integer as described in 6.7.4.5.

The witness function is defined by the formula

$$R = FE2I(\Pi_X) \bmod q.$$

Thus the signature equation becomes

$$HK + RX - S \equiv 0 \pmod{q}.$$

NOTE EC-RDSA stands for Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm. The mechanism is taken from a Russian State Standard [36]. The notation here has been changed from GOST R 34.10-2001 to conform with the notation used in ISO/IEC 14888.

6.7.2 Parameters

p	a prime
E	an elliptic curve group over the field $GF(p)$
$\#E$	the cardinality of E
q	a prime divisor of $\#E$
G	a point on the elliptic curve of order q

Hash-function identifier or OID with specified hash-function.

All these parameters can be public and can be common to a group of users.

6.7.3 Generation of signature key and verification key

The signature key of a signing entity is a secretly generated random or pseudo-random integer X such that $0 < X < q$. The parameter D is 1. The corresponding public verification key Y is

$$Y = [X]G.$$

A user's secret signature key X and public verification key Y are normally fixed for a period of time. The signature key X shall be kept secret.

NOTE The Russian standard for digital signature (GOST R 34.10-2001) does not completely specify the process of generation of a user's secret signature key X .

6.7.4 Signature process

6.7.4.1 Producing the randomizer

The signing entity generates a random or pseudo-random integer K such that $0 < K < q$.

6.7.4.2 Producing the pre-signature

The input to this stage is the randomizer K , and the signing entity computes

$$\Pi = [K]G.$$

6.7.4.3 Preparing message for signing

The message is prepared such that M_1 is empty and M_2 is the message to be signed, i.e., $M_2 = M$.

6.7.4.4 Computing the witness

The signing entity computes $R = FE2I(\Pi_X) \bmod q$.

6.7.4.5 Computing the assignment

The signing entity computes $H = h(M_2)$. H is then converted to an integer according to conversion rule BS2I in Annex B. If H is equal to $0 \bmod q$, then H is set to 1. The assignment (T_1, T_2) is $(BS2I(H), R)$, if $BS2I(H) \neq 0 \bmod q$, or $(1, R)$ otherwise.

6.7.4.6 Computing the second part of the signature

The signature is (R, S) where R is computed as given in 6.7.4.4, and

$$S = RX + KH \bmod q.$$

The signer should check whether $R = 0$ or $S = 0$. If either $R = 0$ or $S = 0$, a new value of K should be generated and the signature should be recalculated.

6.7.4.7 Constructing the appendix

The appendix will be the concatenation of (R, S) and an optional text field *text*, i.e. it will equal $((R, S) || \text{text})$.

6.7.4.8 Constructing the signed message

A signed message is the concatenation of the message M and the appendix

$$M || ((R, S) || \text{text}).$$

6.7.5 Verification process

6.7.5.1 Retrieving the witness

The verifier retrieves the witness R and the second part of the signature S from the appendix. The verifier then checks whether $0 < R < q$ and $0 < S < q$; if either condition does not hold, the signature shall be rejected.

6.7.5.2 Preparing message for verification

The verifier retrieves M from the signed message and divides the message into two parts M_1 and M_2 . M_1 will be empty and $M_2 = M$.

6.7.5.3 Retrieving the assignment

This stage is identical to 6.7.4.5. The inputs to the assignment function consist of the witness R from 6.7.5.1 and M_2 from 6.7.5.2. The assignment $T = (T_1, T_2)$ is recomputed as the output from the assignment function given in 6.7.4.5.

6.7.5.4 Recomputing the pre-signature

The inputs to this stage are system parameters, the verification key Y , the assignment $T = (T_1, T_2)$ from 6.7.5.3, and the second part of the signature S from 6.7.5.1. The verifier obtains a recomputed value $\bar{I}$ of the pre-signature by computing it using the formula

$$\bar{I} = [-T_1^{-1}T_2 \bmod q]Y + [T_1^{-1}S \bmod q]G.$$

6.7.5.5 Recomputing the witness

The computations at this stage are the same as in 6.7.4.4. The verifier executes the witness function. The input is $\bar{I}$ from 6.7.5.4. The output is the recomputed witness $\bar{R}$.

6.7.5.6 Verifying the witness

The verifier compares the recomputed witness, $\bar{R}$ from 6.7.5.5 to the retrieved version of R from 6.7.5.1. If $\bar{R} = R$, then the signature is verified.

6.8 SDSA

6.8.1 Introduction to SDSA

SDSA (Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm) is a signature mechanism with $\mathcal{E} = Z_p^*$, p a prime, and q a prime dividing $p-1$. The parameter D is equal to 1. The message is prepared such that M_1 is the message to be signed, i.e., $M_1 = M$, and M_2 is empty. The witness function is defined by setting R equal to a hash-code. The assignment function is defined by setting $T_1 = -1$ and T_2 equal to the negative of the integer which is obtained by converting R to an integer according to the conversion rule, *BS2I*, given in Annex B and then reducing modulo q .

The coefficients (A, B, C) of the SDSA signature equation are set as follows

$$(A, B, C) = (T_1, T_2, S).$$

Thus the signature equation becomes

$$-K + T_2X + S \equiv 0 \pmod{q}.$$

6.8.2 Parameters

- p a prime, where $2^{\alpha-1} < p < 2^\alpha$.
- q a prime divisor of $p-1$, where $2^{\beta-1} < q < 2^\beta$.
- G a generator of the subgroup of order q , such that $1 < G < q$.

Four choices for the pair (α, h) are allowed in SDSA, namely (1024, SHA-1), (2048, SHA-224), (2048, SHA-256), and (3072, SHA-256). Corresponding β should be selected according to α in 5.1.3.1, Table 1.

The integers p , q , and G can be public and can be common to a group of users.

The parameters p , q and G are generated as specified in Annex D. The parameters p and q can be generated using the prime generation techniques given in ISO/IEC 18032.

NOTE 1 It is recommended that all users check the proper generation of the SDSA public parameters according to FIPS PUB 186-3.

NOTE 2 SHA-1 has recently been demonstrated to provide less than 80 bits of security for digital signatures. The use of SHA-1 is not recommended for the generation of digital signatures.

6.8.3 Generation of signature key and verification key

The signature key of a signing entity is a secretly generated random or pseudo-random integer X such that $0 < X < q$. The parameter D is 1. The corresponding public verification key Y is

$$Y = G^X \bmod p.$$

A user's secret signature key X and public verification key Y are normally fixed for a period of time. The signature key X shall be kept secret.

6.8.4 Signature process

6.8.4.1 Producing the randomizer

The signing entity computes a random or pseudo-random integer K such that $0 < K < q$.

6.8.4.2 Producing the pre-signature

The input to this stage is the randomizer K , and the signing entity computes

$$\Pi = G^K \bmod p.$$

6.8.4.3 Preparing message for signing

The message is prepared such that M_1 is the message to be signed, i.e., $M_1 = M$, and M_2 is empty.

6.8.4.4 Computing the witness

The signing entity computes the witness R as the hash-code of the pre-signature Π and the first part of the message M_1

$$R = h(\Pi || M).$$

6.8.4.5 Computing the assignment

The witness R is converted to an integer according to conversion rule, $BS2I$, in Annex B and then reducing modulo q . The assignment (T_1, T_2) is $(-1, -BS2I(R) \bmod q)$.

6.8.4.6 Computing the second part of the signature

The signature is (R, S) where $S = (K + BS2I(R)X) \bmod q$.

As an option, one may wish to check if $R = 0$ or $S = 0$. If either $R = 0$ or $S = 0$, a new value of K should be generated and the signature should be recalculated. (It is extremely unlikely that $R = 0$ or $S = 0$ if signatures are generated properly).

6.8.4.7 Constructing the appendix

The appendix will be the concatenation of (R, S) and an optional text field *text*.

6.8.4.8 Constructing the signed message

A signed message is the concatenation of the message, M , and the appendix

$$M \parallel ((R, S) \parallel \text{text}).$$

6.8.5 Verification process

The verifying entity acquires the necessary data items required for the verification process.

6.8.5.1 Retrieving the witness

The verifier retrieves the witness R and the second part of the signature S from the appendix. The verifier checks to see that R is a non-zero string within the range of the hash function and that $0 < S < q$.

6.8.5.2 Preparing message for verification

The verifier retrieves M from the signed message and divides the message into two parts M_1 and M_2 , such that $M_1 = M$ and M_2 is empty.

6.8.5.3 Retrieving the assignment

The input to the assignment function consists of the witness R from 6.8.5.1. The assignment

$$T = (T_1, T_2) = (-1, -BS2I(R) \bmod q).$$

6.8.5.4 Recomputing the pre-signature

The inputs to this stage are domain parameters, verification key Y , assignment $T = (T_1, T_2)$ from 6.8.5.3 and second part of the signature S from 6.8.5.1. The verifier obtains a recomputed value II' of the pre-signature by computing it using the formula

$$II' = Y^{(T_2 \bmod q)} G^{(-ST_1 \bmod q)} \bmod p.$$

6.8.5.5 Recomputing the witness

The computations at this stage are the same as in 6.8.4.4 and 6.8.4.5. The verifier executes the witness function. The input is II' from 6.8.5.4 and M_1 from 6.8.5.2. The output is the recomputed witness R' which is the hash-code of the recomputed pre-signature II' and the message M .

6.8.5.6 Verifying the witness

The verifier compares the recomputed witness, R' from 6.8.5.5 to the retrieved version of R from 6.8.5.1. If $R' = R$, then the signature is verified.

6.9 EC-SDSA

6.9.1 Introduction to EC-SDSA

EC-SDSA (Elliptic Curve Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm) is a signature mechanism with verification key $Y = [X]G$; that is, the parameter D is equal to 1. The message is prepared such that M_2 is empty and $M_1 = M$ the message to be signed. The witness R is computed as hash-code

$$R = h(\text{FE2BS}(\Pi_X) \parallel \text{FE2BS}(\Pi_Y) \parallel M).$$

NOTE This specification of EC-SDSA generates the witness by hashing the concatenation of the x-coordinate, the y-coordinate and the message. However, the mechanism would remain secure even if the y-coordinate was omitted from the hash computation. As a result, future versions of this standard may permit the omission of the y-coordinate from the hash calculation to improve performance.

The coefficients (A, B, C) of the EC-SDSA signature equation are set as follows:

$$(A, B, C) = (T_1, T_2, S),$$

where $(T_1, T_2) = (-1, -BS2I(R) \bmod q)$.

Thus the signature equation becomes:

$$-K + T_2X + S \equiv 0 \pmod{q}.$$

6.9.2 Parameters

F	a finite field
E	elliptic curve group over the field F
$\#E$	cardinality of E
q	prime divisor of $\#E$
G	a point of order q on the elliptic curve

Hash-function identifier or OID with specified hash-function.

All these parameters can be public and can be common to a group of users.

NOTE It is recommended that all users check the proper generation of the public parameters according to X9.62 [5].

6.9.3 Generation of signature key and verification key

The signature key of a signing entity is a secretly generated random or pseudo-random integer X such that $0 < X < q$. The parameter D is 1. The corresponding public verification key Y is $Y = [X]G$.

A user's secret signature key X and public verification key Y are normally fixed for a period of time. The signature key X shall be kept secret.

6.9.4 Signature process

6.9.4.1 Producing the randomizer

The signing entity computes a random or pseudo-random integer K such that $0 < K < q$.

6.9.4.2 Producing the pre-signature

The input to this stage is the randomizer K , and the signing entity computes $IT = [K]G$.

6.9.4.3 Preparing message for signing

The message is prepared such that M_1 is the message to be signed, i.e., $M_1 = M$, and M_2 is empty.

6.9.4.4 Computing the witness

The signing entity computes the witness $R = h(FE2BS(IT_X) || FE2BS(IT_Y) || M)$.

6.9.4.5 Computing the assignment

The witness R is converted to an integer according to conversion rule, $BS2I$, in Annex B and then reducing modulo q .

The assignment (T_1, T_2) is $(-1, -BS2I(R) \bmod q)$.

6.9.4.6 Computing the second part of the signature

The signature is (R, S) where $S = (K + BS2I(R)X) \bmod q$.

As an option, one may wish to check if $R = 0$ or $S = 0$. If either $R = 0$ or $S = 0$, a new value of K should be generated and the signature should be recalculated. (It is extremely unlikely that $R = 0$ or $S = 0$ if signatures are generated properly).

6.9.4.7 Constructing the appendix

The appendix will be the concatenation of (R, S) and an optional text field, *text*.

6.9.4.8 Constructing the signed message

A signed message is the concatenation of the message, M , and the appendix:

$$M || ((R, S) || \text{text})$$

6.9.5 Verification process

The verifying entity acquires the necessary data items required for the verification process.

6.9.5.1 Retrieving the witness

The verifier retrieves the witness R and the second part of the signature S from the appendix. The verifier first checks to see that R is a non-zero string within the range of the hash function and $0 < S < q$; if either condition is violated the signature shall be rejected.

6.9.5.2 Preparing message for verification

The verifier retrieves M from the signed message and divides the message into two parts M_1 and M_2 , such that $M_1 = M$ and M_2 is empty.

6.9.5.3 Retrieving the assignment

The input to the assignment function consists of the witness R from 6.9.5.1. The assignment $T = (T_1, T_2) = (-1, -BS2I(R) \bmod q)$.

6.9.5.4 Recomputing the pre-signature

The inputs to this stage are system parameters, verification key Y , assignment $T = (T_1, T_2)$ from 6.9.5.3 and second part of the signature S from 6.9.5.1. The verifier obtains a recomputed value Π' of the pre-signature by computing it using the formula

$$\Pi' = [-ST_1 \bmod q]G + [T_2 \bmod q]Y.$$

6.9.5.5 Recomputing the witness

The computations at this stage are the same as in 6.9.4.4 and 6.9.4.5. The verifier executes the witness function from 6.9.4.4. The input is Π' from 6.9.5.4. The output is the recomputed witness R' which is the hash-code of the recomputed pre-signature Π' and the message M .

6.9.5.6 Verifying the witness

The verifier compares the recomputed witness, R' from 6.9.5.5 to the retrieved version of R from 6.9.5.1. If $R' = R$, then the signature is verified.

6.10 EC-FSDSA

6.10.1 Introduction to EC-FSDSA

EC-FSDSA (Elliptic Curve Full Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm) is a signature mechanism with verification key $Y = [X]G$; that is, the parameter D is equal to 1. The message is prepared such that M_1 is empty and $M_2 = M$ the message to be signed. The witness R is computed as

$$R = FE2BS(\Pi_X) || FE2BS(\Pi_Y).$$

The coefficients (A, B, C) of the EC-FSDSA signature equation are set as follows

$$(A, B, C) = (T_1, T_2, S),$$

where $T = (T_1, T_2) = (-1, -BS2I(h(R||M)) \bmod q)$.

Thus, the signature equation becomes

$$-K + T_2 X + S \equiv 0 \pmod{q}.$$

6.10.2 Parameters

F	a finite field
E	an elliptic curve group over the field F
$\#E$	the cardinality of E
q	a prime divisor of $\#E$
G	a point of order q on the elliptic curve E

Hash function identifier or OID with specified hash function.

All these parameters can be public and can be common to a group of users.

NOTE It is recommended that all users check the proper generation of the public parameters according to X9.62[5].

6.10.3 Generation of signature key and verification key

The signature key of a signing entity is a secretly generated random or pseudo-random integer X such that $0 < X < q$. The parameter D is 1. The corresponding public verification key Y is $Y = [X]G$.

A user's secret signature key X and public verification key Y are normally fixed for a period of time. The signature key X shall be kept secret.

6.10.4 Signature process

6.10.4.1 Producing the randomizer

The signing entity computes a random or pseudo-random integer K such that $0 < K < q$.

6.10.4.2 Producing the pre-signature

The input to this stage is the randomizer K , and the signing entity computes $IT = [K]G$.

6.10.4.3 Preparing message for signing

The message is prepared such that M is the message to be signed, i.e., $M_2 = M$, and M_1 is empty.

6.10.4.4 Computing the witness

The signing entity computes $R = FE2BS(IT_X) || FE2BS(IT_Y)$.

6.10.4.5 Computing the assignment

The signing entity computes the hash code $h(R || M)$. Afterwards, the hash code is converted to an integer according to conversion rule, $BS2I$, in Annex B and then reduced modulo q . The assignment (T_1, T_2) is $(-1, -BS2I(h(R || M)) \bmod q)$.

6.10.4.6 Computing the second part of the signature

The signature is (R, S) where $S = (K + BS_2I(h(R||M))X \bmod q)$.

As an option, one may wish to check if $R = 0$ or $S = 0$. If either $R = 0$ or $S = 0$, a new value of K should be generated and the signature should be recalculated. (It is extremely unlikely that $R = 0$ or $S = 0$ if signatures are generated properly).

6.10.4.7 Constructing the appendix

The appendix will be the concatenation of (R, S) and an optional text field, *text*.

6.10.4.8 Constructing the signed message

A signed message is the concatenation of the message, M , and the appendix:
 $(M || (R, S) || \text{text})$.

6.10.5 Verification process

The verifying entity acquires the necessary data items required for the verification process.

6.10.5.1 Retrieving the witness

The verifier retrieves the witness R and the second part of the signature S from the appendix. The verifier first checks to see that R represents a point on E and $0 < S < q$; if either condition is violated the signature shall be rejected.

6.10.5.2 Preparing message for verification

The verifier retrieves M from the signed message and divides the message into two parts M_1 and M_2 , such that $M_2 = M$ and M_1 is empty.

6.10.5.3 Retrieving the assignment

The input to the assignment function is computed as in 6.10.4.5 from the witness R from 6.10.4.4 and the message M from 6.10.4.3. The assignment is given by $T = (T_1, T_2) = (-1, -BS_2I(h(R||M)) \bmod q)$.

6.10.5.4 Recomputing the pre-signature

The inputs to this stage are system parameters, verification key Y , assignment $T = (T_1, T_2)$ from 6.10.5.3 and second part of the signature S from 6.10.5.1. The verifier obtains a recomputed value Π' of the pre-signature by computing it using the formula

$$\Pi' = [-S T_1 \bmod q]G + [T_2 \bmod q]Y.$$

6.10.5.5 Recomputing the witness

The computations at this stage are the same as in 6.10.4.4. The verifier executes the witness function. The input is Π' from 6.10.5.4. The output is the recomputed witness R' .

6.10.5.6 Verifying the witness

The verifier compares the recomputed witness, R' from 6.10.5.5 to the retrieved version of R from 6.10.5.1. If $R' = R$, then the signature is verified.

Page 33, Annex A

Replace all text after the first paragraph with the following:

```

DigitalSignatureWithAppendixDL {
    iso(1) standard(0) digital-signature-with-appendix (14888) part(3)
        asn1-module(1) discrete-logarithm-based-mechanisms(0) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

-- EXPORTS All; --

IMPORTS

    HashFunctions
        FROM DedicatedHashFunctions {
            iso(1) standard(0) encryption-algorithms(10118) part(3) asn1-module(1)
                dedicated-hash-functions(0) } ;

OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- alias

-- Synonyms --

id-dswa-dl OID ::= {
    iso(1) standard(0) digital-signature-with-appendix(14888) part3(3)
        algorithm(0) }

-- Assignments --

id-dswa-dl-DSA      OID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x9-57(10040)
x9cm(4) dsa-with-sha1(3) }
id-dswa-dl-KCDSA    OID ::= { id-dswa-dl kcdsa(2) }
id-dswa-dl-PVS      OID ::= { id-dswa-dl pvs(3) }
id-dswa-dl-EC-DSA    OID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x9-62(10045)
signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA1(1) }
id-dswa-dl-EC-KCDSA  OID ::= { id-dswa-dl ec-kcdsa(5) }
id-dswa-dl-EC-GDSA   OID ::= { id-dswa-dl ec-gdsa(6) }
id-dswa-dl-IBS-1     OID ::= { id-dswa-dl ibs-1(7) }
id-dswa-dl-IBS-2     OID ::= { id-dswa-dl ibs-2(8) }
id-dswa-dl-EC-RDSA   OID ::= { id-dswa-dl ec-rdsa(9) }
id-dswa-dl-SDSA      OID ::= { id-dswa-dl sdsa(10) }
id-dswa-dl-EC-SDSA   OID ::= { id-dswa-dl ec-sdsa(11) }
id-dswa-dl-EC-FSDSA  OID ::= { id-dswa-dl ec-fsdsa(12) }

DigitalSignatureWithAppendix ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({DSAlgorithms}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({DSAlgorithms}){@algorithm} OPTIONAL
}

```



```

DSAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
    dswa-dl-DSA
    dswa-dl-KCDSA
    dswa-dl-PVS
    dswa-dl-EC-DSA
    dswa-dl-EC-KCDSA
    dswa-dl-EC-GDSA
    dswa-dl-IBS-1
    dswa-dl-IBS-2
    dswa-dl EC-RDSA
    dswa-dl SDSA
    dswa-dl EC-SDSA
    dswa-dl EC-FSDSA,

    ... -- Expect additional algorithms --
}

dswa-dl-DSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-DSA PARMS NullParms
}

dswa-dl-KCDSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-KCDSA PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-PVS ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-PVS PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-EC-DSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-EC-DSA PARMS NullParms
}

dswa-dl-EC-KCDSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-EC-KCDSA PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-EC-GDSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-EC-GDSA PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-IBS-1 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-IBS-1 PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-IBS-2 ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-IBS-2 PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-EC-RDSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-EC-RDSA PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-SDSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-SDSA PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-EC-SDSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-EC-SDSA PARMS HashFunctions
}

dswa-dl-EC-FSDSA ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID id-dswa-dl-EC-FSDSA PARMS HashFunctions
}

```

```

NullParms ::= NULL

-- Cryptographic algorithm identification --

ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
    &id      OBJECT IDENTIFIER  UNIQUE,
    &Type    OPTIONAL
}
WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARMS &Type] }

END -- DigitalSignatureWithAppendixDL --

```

NOTE 1 - Alternative OIDs for KCDSA presented in KCAC.TG.OID are as follows:

```

{iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(20004) npki-alg(1) kcdsa1(21)}
- KCDSA
{iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(20004) npki-alg(1) kcdsa1WithHAS160(22)}
- KCDSA with HAS160, where the HAS160 is a Korean hash standard algorithm
{iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(20004) npki-alg(1) kcdsa1WithSHA1(23)}
- KCDSA with SHA1

```

NOTE 2 - Alternative OIDs for EC-DSA presented in X9.62 are as follows:

```

{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x9-62(10045) signatures(4)
  ecdsa-with-Recommended(2)} - EC-DSA with Recommended
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x9-62(10045) signatures(4)
  ecdsa-with-Specified(3)} - EC-DSA with Specified

```

NOTE 3 - Alternative OID for EC-KCDSA with HAS160 presented in TTAS.KO-12.0015 is

```

{iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410) kisa(20004) npki-alg(1) ecc(100) signature(4)
  eckdsa-with-HAS160(1)}

```

Page 63, Annex F

Add the following subclauses to the end of Annex F:

F.9 EC-RDSA mechanism

F.9.1 Introduction to the EC-RDSA mechanism

For the following example, SHA-256 is used exclusively for the hash-function, so the hash-code is simply the value of SHA-256, converted according to Annex B to the appropriate data item.

NOTE From a security viewpoint, it is important to avoid cryptographically weak curves (e.g., it should be ensured that a particular curve is not vulnerable to attacks on special instances of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem).

F.9.2 Field F_p , 256-bit Prime P

F.9.2.1 Parameters

The field is F_p where P is in hexadecimal

```

P = 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
    00000000 00000431

```

The elliptic curve is: $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$ over F_p .

$a = 7$

```

b = 5FBFF498 AA938CE7 39B8E022 FBAFEF40 563F6E6A 3472FC2A
    514C0CE9 DAE23B7E

```

$$G = (G_x, G_y)$$

$$G_x = 2$$

$$G_y = 08E2A8A0 \ 0E65147D4 \ BD631603 \ 0E16D19C \ 85C97F0A \ 9CA26712 \\ 2B96ABBC \ EA7E8FC8$$

$$Q = 80000000 \ 00000000 \ 00000000 \ 00000001 \ 50FE8A18 \ 92976154 \\ C59CFC19 \ 3ACCF5B3$$

F.9.2.2 Signature key and verification key

$$X = 7A929ADE \ 789BB9BE \ 10ED359D \ D39A72C1 \ 1B60961F \ 49397EEE \\ 1D19CE98 \ 91EC3B28$$

$$Y = (Y_x, Y_y)$$

$$Y_x = 7F2B49E2 \ 70DB6D90 \ D8595BEC \ 458B50C5 \ 8585BA1D \ 4E9B788F \\ 6689DBD8 \ E56FD80B$$

$$Y_y = 26F1B489 \ D6701DD1 \ 85C8413A \ 977B3CBB \ AF64D1C5 \ 93D26627 \\ DFFB101A \ 87FF77DA$$

F.9.2.3 Per message data

$$M = \text{ASCII form of "abc"} = 616263$$

$$h(M) = BA7816BF \ 8F01CFEA \ 414140DE \ 5DAE2223 \ B00361A3 \ 96177A9C \\ B410FF61 \ F20015AD$$

$$K = 77105C9B \ 20BCD312 \ 2823C8CF \ 6FCC7B95 \ 6DE33814 \ E95B7FE6 \\ 4FED9245 \ 94DCEAB3$$

$$\Pi = (\Pi_x, \Pi_y)$$

$$\Pi_x = 41AA28D2 \ F1AB1482 \ 80CD9ED5 \ 6FEDA419 \ 74053554 \ A42767B8 \\ 3AD043FD \ 39DC0493$$

$$\Pi_y = 489C375A \ 9941A304 \ 9E33B343 \ 61DD2041 \ 72AD98C3 \ E5916DE2 \\ 7695D22A \ 61FAE46E$$

F.9.2.4 Signature

$$R = 41AA28D2 \ F1AB1482 \ 80CD9ED5 \ 6FEDA419 \ 74053554 \ A42767B8 \\ 3AD043FD \ 39DC0493$$

$$S = 0A7BA472 \ 2DA5693F \ 229D175F \ AB6AFB85 \ 7EC2273B \ 9F88DA58 \\ 92CED311 \ 7FCF1E36$$

F.9.2.5 Verification

$$\bar{\Pi} = (\bar{\Pi}_x, \bar{\Pi}_y)$$

$$\bar{\Pi}_x = 41AA28D2 \ F1AB1482 \ 80CD9ED5 \ 6FEDA419 \ 74053554 \ A42767B8 \\ 3AD043FD \ 39DC0493$$

$$\bar{\Pi}_y = \underline{489C375A \ 9941A304 \ 9E33B343 \ 61DD2041 \ 72AD98C3 \ E5916DE2} \\ \underline{7695D22A \ 61FAE46E}$$

$$\bar{R} = 41AA28D2 \ F1AB1482 \ 80CD9ED5 \ 6FEDA419 \ 74053554 \ A42767B8 \\ 3AD043FD \ 39DC0493$$

F.10 SDSA mechanism

F.10.1 Introduction to the SDSA mechanism

For example F.10.2, the RFC-5114 2048-bit MODP group with 224-bit prime order subgroup is used as the group. SHA-224 is used exclusively for the hash-function, so the hash-code is simply the value of SHA-224, converted according to Annex B to the appropriate data item.

For example F.10.3, the RFC-5114 2048-bit MODP group with 256-bit prime order subgroup is used as the group. SHA-256 is used exclusively for the hash-function, so the hash-code is simply the value of SHA-256, converted according to Annex B to the appropriate data item.

F.10.2 2048-bit Group with 224-bit Prime order Subgroup

F.10.2.1 Parameters

$$\alpha = 2048$$

$$\beta = 224$$

$$p = \begin{array}{llllll} \text{AD107E1E} & 9123\text{A9D0} & \text{D660FAA7} & 9559\text{C51F} & \text{A20D64E5} & 683\text{B9FD1} \\ \text{B54B1597} & \text{B61D0A75} & \text{E6FA141D} & \text{F95A56DB} & \text{AF9A3C40} & 7\text{BA1DF15} \\ \text{EB3D688A} & 309\text{C180E} & 1\text{DE6B85A} & 1274\text{A0A6} & 6\text{D3F8152} & \text{AD6AC212} \\ 9037\text{C9ED} & \text{EFDA4DF8} & \text{D91E8FEF} & 55\text{B7394B} & 7\text{AD5B7D0} & \text{B6C12207} \\ \text{C9F98D11} & \text{ED34DBF6} & \text{C6BA0B2C} & 8\text{BBC27BE} & 6\text{A00E0A0} & \text{B9C49708} \\ \text{B3BF8A31} & 70918836 & 81286130 & \text{BC8985DB} & 1602\text{E714} & 415\text{D9330} \\ 278273\text{C7} & \text{DE31EFDC} & 7310\text{F712} & 1\text{FD5A074} & 15987\text{D9A} & \text{DC0A486D} \\ \text{CDF93ACC} & 44328387 & 315\text{D75E1} & 98\text{C641A4} & 80\text{CD86A1} & \text{B9E587E8} \\ \text{BE60E69C} & \text{C928B2B9} & \text{C52172E4} & 13042\text{E9B} & 23\text{F10B0E} & 16\text{E79763} \\ \text{C9B53DCF} & 4\text{BA80A29} & \text{E3FB73C1} & 6\text{B8E75B9} & 7\text{EF363E2} & \text{FFA31F71} \\ \text{CF9DE538} & 4\text{E71B81C} & 0\text{AC4DFFE} & 0\text{C10E64F} & & \end{array}$$

$$G = \begin{array}{llllll} \text{AC4032EF} & 4\text{F2D9AE3} & 9\text{DF30B5C} & 8\text{EFDAC50} & 6\text{CDEBE7B} & 89998\text{CAF} \\ 74866\text{A08} & \text{CFE4FFE3} & \text{A6824A4E} & 10\text{B9A6F0} & \text{DD921F01} & \text{A70C4AFA} \\ \text{AB739D77} & 00\text{C29F52} & \text{C57DB17C} & 620\text{A8652} & \text{BE5E9001} & \text{A8D66AD7} \\ \text{C1766910} & 1999024\text{A} & \text{F4D02727} & 5\text{AC1348B} & \text{B8A762D0} & 521\text{BC98A} \\ \text{E2471504} & 22\text{EA1ED4} & 09939\text{D54} & \text{DA7460CD} & \text{B5F6C6B2} & 50717\text{CBE} \\ \text{F180EB34} & 118\text{E98D1} & 19529\text{A45} & \text{D6F83456} & 6\text{E3025E3} & 16\text{A330EF} \\ \text{BB77A86F} & 0\text{C1AB15B} & 051\text{AE3D4} & 28\text{C8F8AC} & \text{B70A8137} & 150\text{B8EEB} \\ 10\text{E183ED} & \text{D19963DD} & \text{D9E263E4} & 770589\text{EF} & 6\text{AA21E7F} & 5\text{F2FF381} \\ \text{B539CCE3} & 409\text{D13CD} & 566\text{AFBB4} & 8\text{D6C0191} & 81\text{E1BCFE} & 94\text{B30269} \\ \text{EDFE72FE} & 9\text{B6AA4BD} & 7\text{B5A0F1C} & 71\text{CFFF4C} & 19\text{C418E1} & \text{F6EC0179} \\ 81\text{BC087F} & 2\text{A7065B3} & 84\text{B890D3} & 191\text{F2BFA} & & \end{array}$$

$$q = \begin{array}{llllll} 801\text{C0D34} & \text{C58D93FE} & 99717710 & 1\text{F80535A} & 4738\text{CEBC} & \text{BF389A99} \\ \text{B36371EB} & & & & & \end{array}$$

F.10.2.2 Signature key and verification key

$$X = \begin{array}{llllll} 602\text{FE736} & 80\text{BEFCB2} & \text{A8B46779} & 35\text{FF652B} & 21\text{A3F4DE} & 46725\text{D07} \\ \text{D7D371A9} & & & & & \end{array}$$

$Y =$ A7DBB446 FD8C4B82 61BE026D 94FA9847 74B17110 CAB0944
 14AD2013 2EFC8B7D 7C7FF05D D0B902C4 EF736831 61C1F9A3
 9D60E7AB E3BD9FE2 B458A96D F4783408 0AA93CAF 09673967
 F434548D 44B278E0 4C1FA6D5 E0C41990 CEF37940 66015ED4
 748DAD56 429596DD 9259C45C 21B71A5E A4EF099A 06DAC737
 8958A107 B11B3E57 384118E0 19897C48 E734F069 E717E23A
 DD202405 823A2AE7 A08AFA51 09D2CF6A 0FF546FA 38A8735D
 1CE715E0 6AC08EB0 93EB331F EBEC88D6 1DF546E2 DC9E8465
 10B63F6A 5BA73FE3 6995BD17 1B9D7D35 9EEB3D7D B801F382
 1D582280 DF71A27D 5191E4AB 42BE27A3 1180F537 CABAC0D1
 2EBF1698 B1884697 9EDCA15D DC8F86DC

F.10.2.3 Per message data

$M =$ ASCII form of "abc" = 616263

$K =$ 7BFA2DD5 6B31BB27 FFC0D1AE 1ABAA90F A0BB9379 08A542A1
 5EFD1E15

$II =$ 60FCB613 40799851 B5E2DC3A 3865BC21 29100D38 4B1C9A94
 6F0C873B 442BEBD8 5904CD09 A4C6A29E 0CD1111E B9E65F82
 85F8A578 A5717098 FA2A601F D9183CDD D5FF1586 AB255E1D
 4DF4A141 DFE717DC 16DA3B0D 438B1EA5 4976523F 1D73351B
 F39B1987 97DA0EC7 E9EE994A 4C0352D8 271D186A 0DEA8AB0
 FD5E7862 17016E91 03C5F139 2C1D3C01 B974BADC 88184905
 065F8DA8 55656BAF B3B1EDBC 4C14A969 2AEA1A71 D85117F4
 08548EF5 A34966B9 0123FC81 72472B44 06D0C2E6 77C3C21D
 D0680C63 0DC69BFF BA67D89F F17CA52A 6B0F164F 5452777D
 B838BDBD EE60E03B AE773475 42435BD9 09D021DD F97602E0
 3FE41463 CC18128B AFA6E661 6F6CA744

$R =$ CC192C12 72872367 48346281 4DF721E5 D9B2A651 0D97F3D3
 316AD681

F.10.2.4 Signature

$R =$ CC192C12 72872367 48346281 4DF721E5 D9B2A651 0D97F3D3
 316AD681

$S =$ 4C776699 9F9D52E1 52B47F29 335E548F A3B90625 C55FC9A4
 FE2D5F1F

F.10.2.5 Verification

$II =$ 60FCB613 40799851 B5E2DC3A 3865BC21 29100D38 4B1C9A94
 6F0C873B 442BEBD8 5904CD09 A4C6A29E 0CD1111E B9E65F82
 85F8A578 A5717098 FA2A601F D9183CDD D5FF1586 AB255E1D
 4DF4A141 DFE717DC 16DA3B0D 438B1EA5 4976523F 1D73351B
 F39B1987 97DA0EC7 E9EE994A 4C0352D8 271D186A 0DEA8AB0
 FD5E7862 17016E91 03C5F139 2C1D3C01 B974BADC 88184905
 065F8DA8 55656BAF B3B1EDBC 4C14A969 2AEA1A71 D85117F4
 08548EF5 A34966B9 0123FC81 72472B44 06D0C2E6 77C3C21D
 D0680C63 0DC69BFF BA67D89F F17CA52A 6B0F164F 5452777D
 B838BDBD EE60E03B AE773475 42435BD9 09D021DD F97602E0
 3FE41463 CC18128B AFA6E661 6F6CA744

$R' =$ CC192C12 72872367 48346281 4DF721E5 D9B2A651 0D97F3D3
 316AD681

F.10.3 2048-bit MODP Group with 256-bit Prime order Subgroup**F.10.3.1 Parameters**

$$\alpha = 2048$$

$$\beta = 256$$

$p =$ 87A8E61D B4B6663C FFBBBD19C 65195999 8CEE6F608 660DD0F2
 5D2CEED4 435E3B00 E00DF8F1 D61957D4 FAF7DF45 61B2AA30
 16C3D911 34096FAA 3BF4296D 830E9A7C 209E0C64 97517ABD
 5A8A9D30 6BCF67ED 91F9E672 5B4758C0 22E0B1EF 4275BF7B
 6C5BFC11 D45F9088 B941F54E B1E59BB8 BC39A0BF 12307F5C
 4FDB70C5 81B23F76 B63ACAE1 CAA6B790 2D525267 35488A0E
 F13C6D9A 51BFA4AB 3AD83477 96524D8E F6A167B5 A41825D9
 67E144E5 14056425 1CCACB83 E6B486F6 B3CA3F79 71506026
 C0B857F6 89962856 DED4010A BD0BE621 C3A3960A 54E710C3
 75F26375 D7014103 A4B54330 C198AF12 6116D227 6E11715F
 693877FA D7EF09CA DB094AE9 1E1A1597

$G =$ 3FB32C9B 73134D0B 2E775066 60EDBD48 4CA7B18F 21EF2054
 07F4793A 1A0BA125 10DBC150 77BE463F FF4FED4A AC0BB555
 BE3A6C1B 0C6B47B1 BC3773BF 7E8C6F62 901228F8 C28CBB18
 A55AE313 41000A65 0196F931 C77A57F2 DDF463E5 E9EC144B
 777DE62A AAB8A862 8AC376D2 82D6ED38 64E67982 428EBC83
 1D14348F 6F2F9193 B5045AF2 767164E1 DFC967C1 FB3F2E55
 A4BD1BFF E83B9C80 D052B985 D182EA0A DB2A3B73 13D3FE14
 C8484B1E 052588B9 B7D2BBD2 DF016199 ECD06E15 57CD0915
 B3353BBB 64E0EC37 7FD02837 0DF92B52 C7891428 CDC67EB6
 184B523D 1DB246C3 2F630784 90F00EF8 D647D148 D4795451
 5E2327CF EF98C582 664B4C0F 6CC41659

$q =$ 8CF83642 A709A097 B4479976 40129DA2 99B1A47D 1EB3750B
 A308B0FE 64F5FBD3

F.10.3.2 Signature key and verification key

$X =$ 73018895 20D47AA0 55995BA1 D8FCD701 6EA62E09 18892E07
 B7DC23AF 69006B88

$Y =$ 57A17258 D4A3F47C 4545AD51 F3109C5D B41B7878 79FCFE53
 8DC1DD5D 35CE42FF 3A9F225E DE650212 6408FCB1 3AEA2231
 80B149C4 64E176EB F03BA651 0D8206C9 20F6B1E0 9392E6C8
 40A05BDE 9D6875AB 3F4817EC 3A65A665 B788ECBB 447188C7
 DF2EB4D3 D9424E57 D964398D BE1C6362 659C6BD8 55C1D3E5
 1D64796C A598480D FDD9580E 55085345 C15E34D6 A33A2F43
 E222407A CE058972 D34952AE 2B705C53 2243BE39 4B222329
 6161145E F2927CDB C55BBD56 4AAE8DE4 BA4500A7 FA432FE7
 8B0F0689 1E408083 7E761057 BC6CB8AC 18FD4320 7582032A
 FB63C624 F32E66B0 5FC31C5D FFB25FA9 2D4D00E2 B0D4F721
 E88C417D 2E57797B 8F55A2FF C6EE4DDB

F.10.3.3 Per message data

$$M = \text{ASCII form of "abc"} = 616263$$

$K =$ 2B73E8FF 3A7C0168 6CA556E0 FABFD74A C8D1FDA4 AD3D503F
 23B8EB8A EEC63305

Π = 41979DBA 19606871 A25BBB51 665AD584 9511D125 8C077E93
 027D79AC 35EE887C 460C2689 3D7FFC59 0F317B7A 2C01FCB4
 3667E373 F8F2D239 0C950BAF 972E6E0B 00A79416 9696CC95
 08A895D6 3F8AA7EA 564AA5DE 6104920A 5E9F687F 469BC831
 0C02BE30 B8FD4A54 A167E114 01FEE171 EF284811 6146CC69
 C0899526 7186C43E 98B5E62E 9CE5C344 646950EF F57B1490
 27FE078F CD9C8297 4AFF1DDE 5AF18E4C A3E3787F 66D15D23
 292B5F4E 225AAC64 FC904AB3 40A88B76 40F2D436 D2840185
 077EACA4 EE75113E 95B26149 F7C6D2CD 554463F9 26E48F09
 AD3C99B8 5EA3EC39 E795FEAE C90C8293 FB0D0506 0FE2BF91
 5F00E2FB 7C17B2E8 7C462ED0 D49B8E2F

R = CDAC932A 758FCFCE 7E549903 FD891F41 FB5410CB DDD246F3
 D6DB0CE6 E0ED696E

F.10.3.4 Signature

R = CDAC932A 758FCFCE 7E549903 FD891F41 FB5410CB DDD246F3
 D6DB0CE6 E0ED696E

S = 3505AEA2 E039E18F DDC6580A E89E15DF 0103FB45 C1BB763E
 DA4EE6F5 F01783CE

F.10.3.5 Verification

Π = 41979DBA 19606871 A25BBB51 665AD584 9511D125 8C077E93
 027D79AC 35EE887C 460C2689 3D7FFC59 0F317B7A 2C01FCB4
 3667E373 F8F2D239 0C950BAF 972E6E0B 00A79416 9696CC95
 08A895D6 3F8AA7EA 564AA5DE 6104920A 5E9F687F 469BC831
 0C02BE30 B8FD4A54 A167E114 01FEE171 EF284811 6146CC69
 C0899526 7186C43E 98B5E62E 9CE5C344 646950EF F57B1490
 27FE078F CD9C8297 4AFF1DDE 5AF18E4C A3E3787F 66D15D23
 292B5F4E 225AAC64 FC904AB3 40A88B76 40F2D436 D2840185
 077EACA4 EE75113E 95B26149 F7C6D2CD 554463F9 26E48F09
 AD3C99B8 5EA3EC39 E795FEAE C90C8293 FB0D0506 0FE2BF91
 5F00E2FB 7C17B2E8 7C462ED0 D49B8E2F

R' = CDAC932A 758FCFCE 7E549903 FD891F41 FB5410CB DDD246F3
 D6DB0CE6 E0ED696E

F.11 EC-SDSA mechanism

F.11.1 Introduction to the EC-SDSA mechanism

For example F.11.2, the NIST curve P256 is used as the elliptic curve. SHA-256 is used exclusively for the hash-function, so the hash-code is simply the value of SHA-256, converted according to Annex B to the appropriate data item.

For example F.11.3, the NIST curve P384 is used as the elliptic curve. SHA-384 is used exclusively for the hash-function, so the hash-code is simply the value of SHA-384, converted according to Annex B to the appropriate data item.

NOTE - From a security viewpoint it is important to avoid cryptographically weak curves (e.g. it should be ensured that a particular curve is not vulnerable to attacks on special instances of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem).

F.11.2 Field F_P , 256-bit Prime P **F.11.2.1 Parameters**

The field is F_P where P is in hexadecimal

$P =$ FFFFFFFF 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 FFFFFFFF
 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

The elliptic curve is: $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$ over F_P .

$a =$ FFFFFFFF 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 FFFFFFFF
 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

$b =$ 5AC635D8 AA3A93E7 B3EBBD55 769886BC 651D06B0 CC53B0F6
 3BCE3C3E 27D2604B

$G = (G_x, G_y)$

$G_x =$ 6B17D1F2 E12C4247 F8BCE6E5 63A440F2 77037D81 2DEB33A0
 F4A13945 D898C296

$G_y =$ 4FE342E2 FE1A7F9B 8EE7EB4A 7C0F9E16 2BCE3357 6B315ECE
 CBB64068 37BF51F5

$q =$ FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF BCE6FAAD A7179E84
 F3B9CAC2 FC632551

F.11.2.2 Signature key and verification key

$X =$ 5202A3D8 ACAF6909 D12C9A77 4CD886F9 FBA61137 FFD3E8E7
 6AED363F B47AC492

$Y = (Y_x, Y_y)$

$Y_x =$ 9B58B883 23C52D10 80AA525C 89E8E12C 6F40FCB0 14640FA8
 8081ED9E 9352DE7

$Y_y =$ 5CCBBD18 95385162 38B0B0B2 8ACB5F0B 5E27217C 3A987242
 1219DE0A EEBF1080

F.11.2.3 Per message data

$M =$ ASCII form of "abc" = 616263

$K =$ DE7E0E5E 663F2418 3414B7C7 2F24546B 81E9E5F4 10BEBF26
 F3CA5FA8 2F5192C8

$\Pi = (\Pi_x, \Pi_y)$

$\Pi_x =$ 847CE3CD 474FEC19 722AA9BA 81AFBF34 7EE2D70E D067413F
 1F716783 27A758CA

$\Pi_y =$ DBFAD4AF 8C1D93AB 9C16467E 96BD11B5 33643AA6 63498D8F
 95919C6C A1AD91FC

$FE2BS(\Pi_x) || FE2BS(\Pi_y) =$ 847CE3CD 474FEC19 722AA9BA 81AFBF34
 7EE2D70E D067413F 1F716783 27A758CA DBFAD4AF 8C1D93AB
 9C16467E 96BD11B5 33643AA6 63498D8F 95919C6C A1AD91FC

$R = h(FE2BS(\Pi_x) || FE2BS(\Pi_y) || M) = 5A79A0AA\ 9B241E38$
 1A594B22 0554D096 A5F09FA6 28AD9A33 C3CE4393 ADE1DEF7

F.11.2.4 Signature

$R = 5A79A0AA\ 9B241E38\ 1A594B22\ 0554D096\ A5F09FA6\ 28AD9A33$
 C3CE4393 ADE1DEF7

$S = 5C0EB78B\ 67A513C3\ E53B2619\ F96855E2\ 91D5141C\ 7CD0915E$
 1D04B347 457C9601

F.11.2.5 Verification

$\Pi = (\Pi_x, \Pi_y)$

$\Pi_x = 847CE3CD\ 474FEC19\ 722AA9BA\ 81AFBF34\ 7EE2D70E\ D067413F$
 1F716783 27A758CA

$\Pi_y = DBFAD4AF\ 8C1D93AB\ 9C16467E\ 96BD11B5\ 33643AA6\ 63498D8F$
 95919C6C A1AD91FC

$FE2BS(\Pi'_x) || FE2BS(\Pi'_y) = 847CE3CD\ 474FEC19\ 722AA9BA\ 81AFBF34$
 7EE2D70E D067413F 1F716783 27A758CA DBFAD4AF 8C1D93AB
 9C16467E 96BD11B5 33643AA6 63498D8F 95919C6C A1AD91FC

$R' = h(FE2BS(\Pi'_x) || FE2BS(\Pi'_y) || M) = 5A79A0AA\ 9B241E38\ 1A594B22$
 0554D096 A5F09FA6 28AD9A33 C3CE4393 ADE1DEF7

F.11.3 Field F_p , 384-bit Prime P

F.11.3.1 Parameters

The field is F_p where P is in hexadecimal

$P = \text{FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF}$
 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF 00000000 00000000 FFFFFFFF

The elliptic curve is: $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$ over F_p .

$a = \text{FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF}$
 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF 00000000 00000000 FFFFFFFC

$b = B3312FA7\ E23EE7E4\ 988E056B\ E3F82D19\ 181D9C6E\ FE814112$
 0314088F 5013875A C656398D 8A2ED19D 2A85C8ED D3EC2AEF

$G = (G_x, G_y)$

$G_x = AA87CA22\ BE8B0537\ 8EB1C71E\ F320AD74\ 6E1D3B62\ 8BA79B98$
 59F741E0 82542A38 5502F25D BF55296C 3A545E38 72760AB7

$G_y = 3617DE4A\ 96262C6F\ 5D9E98BF\ 9292DC29\ F8F41DBD\ 289A147C$
 E9DA3113 B5F0B8C0 0A60B1CE 1D7E819D 7A431D7C 90EA0E5F

$q = \text{FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF}$
 C7634D81 F4372DDF 581A0DB2 48B0A77A ECEC196A CCC52973