



INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009

TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION • МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ ПО СТАНДАРТИЗАЦИИ • ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE NORMALISATION
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION • МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ЭЛЕКТРОТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ КОМИССИЯ • COMMISSION ÉLECTROTECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE

Information technology — Personal identification — ISO-compliant driving licence —

Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation

TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2

Technologies de l'information — Identification des personnes — Permis de conduire conforme à l'ISO —

Partie 3: Contrôle d'accès, authentification et validation d'intégrité

RECTIFICATIF TECHNIQUE 2

Technical Corrigendum 1 to ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 17, *Cards and personal identification*.

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Replace clause B.10.4 with the following:

B.10.4 Example Using Configuration 4

Static document keying material:

$K_{doc} = '348D2F25C266CC8068F99391BF0F5CCB876B5F5DDB004D0E5C8BCD1D3ACF2FDADA'$

Compute Basic Access Keys:

Input: $K_{seed} = H_{SHA-256}(K_{doc})$
 $K_{seed} = '2E3AB26DC47C4BA6724E58514492ABF3B2B92BD21A40BEBFAF0D7A52D291EA98'$

Encryption Key (K_{enc}) computation:

1. Concatenate K_{seed} and c (c = 1):
 $D = '2E3AB26DC47C4BA6724E58514492ABF300000001'$
2. Calculate the hash of D:
 $H_{SHA-256}(D) = '0AFD72514422FD43622BB3F1680F62435A6F9B8E83C92A299D3B89124D89B611'$
3. Form key:
 $K_{enc} = '0AFD72514422FD43622BB3F1680F62435A6F9B8E83C92A299D3B89124D89B611'$

Message Authentication Key (K_{mac}) computation:

4. Concatenate K_{seed} and c (c = 2):
 $D = '2E3AB26DC47C4BA6724E58514492ABF300000002'$
5. Calculate the hash of D:
 $H_{SHA-256}(D) = 'F3BC7313E7D34BB3BE0EB07B4DF9DE6AE73A4CA604FE1516AEBFB4140115A5A6'$
6. Form key:
 $K_{mac} = 'F3BC7313E7D34BB3BE0EB07B4DF9DE6AE73A4CA604FE1516AEBFB4140115A5A6'$

Authentication and Establishment of Session Keys:

IS:

1. Request an 8 byte random challenge from the document's SIC:

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'84'	'00'	'00'	'08'

Document SIC:

2. Generate random challenge and return it to IS:
RND.ICC = 'E880AAE12EB3A5FB'

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
RND.ICC	'90'	'00'

IS:

3. Generate an 8-byte random challenge and 24-byte random keying material:
RND.IFD = 'B962840EFBFE80C9'
K.IFD = '1D05B3E621AC7BB4786AC1657D0C4C11
58875525EB21659D905674FCAFF94421'
4. Concatenate RND.IFD, RND.ICC and K.IFD:
S = 'B962840EFBFE80C9E880AAE12EB3A5FB
1D05B3E621AC7BB4786AC1657D0C4C11
58875525EB21659D905674FCAFF94421'
5. Encrypt S using AES with key K_{enc} :
E_IFD = 'DA020143D3816ACB4EF104FDAAFA30A7
BC49BFE6B616D9D061F728EB063362A1
C435F95DDACBE36C37A09472BBCD464B'
6. Compute CMAC over E_IFD with key K_{mac} :
M_IFD = '4F3B9205ADB2DD20'
7. Construct command data for MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE and send command to the document's SIC:
cmd_data = 'DA020143D3816ACB4EF104FDAAFA30A7
BC49BFE6B616D9D061F728EB063362A
1C435F95DDACBE36C37A09472BBCD464B
4F3B9205ADB2DD20'

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'00'	'82'	'00'	'00'	'38'	cmd_data	'38'

Document SIC:

8. Generate 16-byte random keying material:
K.ICC = '56F1510FDCC2B01787E80D2D5E340840
20C93698AF4599C9B9B7D68EB2E958B7'
9. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:
 K_{seed} = '4BF4E2E9FD6ECBA3FF82CC4823384451
784E63BD4464FC5429E1A2721D101C96'

10. Derive session keys:
 $KS_{enc} = '60BDD38EE1B27EEAC7AF9907889F2E0474C7AF231C71705BB2A84BF87BA825FF'$
 $KS_{mac} = '978E2D4BFC62716966B215A28980ED041756A53EBC56AE7CE9F8341167210C33'$
11. Initialize send sequence counter:
 $SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80C9'$
12. Concatenate RND.ICC, RND.IFD and K.ICC; and add padding:
 $R = 'E880AAE12EB3A5FBB962840EFBFE80C956F1510FDCC2B01787E80D2D5E34084020C93698AF4599C9B9B7D68EB2E958B7'$
13. Encrypt R using AES with key K_{enc} :
 $E_ICC = '2918E899CF1B797F5F869521B1B942B78F72C19AA8162C82BA5295733D33C2F72BABED4C7687E8D2A58E9C4F109F92A2'$
14. Compute CMAC over E_ICC with key K_{mac} :
 $M_ICC = '2FDBF985C7DA7CCF'$
15. Construct response data and send response APDU to the IS:
 $resp_data = '2918E899CF1B797F5F869521B1B942B78F72C19AA8162C82BA5295733D33C2F72BABED4C7687E8D2A58E9C4F109F92A22FDBF985C7DA7CCF'$

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

16. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:
 $K_{seed} = '4BF4E2E9FD6ECBA3FF82CC4823384451784E63BD4464FC5429E1A2721D101C96'$
17. Derive session keys:
 $KS_{enc} = '60BDD38EE1B27EEAC7AF9907889F2E0474C7AF231C71705BB2A84BF87BA825FF'$
 $KS_{mac} = '978E2D4BFC62716966B215A28980ED041756A53EBC56AE7CE9F8341167210C33'$
18. Initialize send sequence counter:
 $SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80C9'$

IS:

1. SELECT EF.COM (file identifier = '01 1E'):

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field
'00'	'A4'	'02'	'00'	'02'	'01 1E'

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:
cmd_header = '0CA4020C800000000000000000000000'
- b) Pad data:
p_data = '011E8000000000000000000000000000'
- c) Encrypt p_data using AES with K_{enc} :
enc_data = 'C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51F9BE58'
- d) Build DO'87':
DO87 = '871101C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51F9BE58'
- e) Concatenate cmd_header and DO87:
M = '0CA4020C800000000000000000000000
871101C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51F9BE58'
- f) Compute CMAC of M with K_{mac} :
- Increment SSC:
SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CA'
 - Concatenate padded SSC and M:
N = '000000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CA
0CA4020C800000000000000000000000
871101C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51F9BE58'
 - Compute MAC:
CC = 'EC6B4CF08A7206D8'
- g) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E08EC6B4CF08A7206D8'
- h) Construct command data:
cmd_data = '871101C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51F9BE588E08EC6B4CF08A7206D8'

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'A4'	'02'	'0C'	'1D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

2. Set EF.COM as the currently selected file and send affirmative response to IS:

Unprotected response APDU:

SW1	SW2
'90'	'00'

- a) Build DO'99':
DO99 = '99029000'
- b) Compute CMAC of DO99 with KS_{mac} :
 - Increment SSC:
 SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CB'
 - Concatenate padded SSC and DO99:
 N = '00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CB99029000'
 - Compute MAC:
 CC = '22CC755FA2A7973B'
- c) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E0822CC755FA2A7973B'
- d) Construct response data:
resp_data = '990290008E0822CC755FA2A7973B'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

3. READ BINARY of the first 4 bytes:

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'04'

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:
cmd_header = '0CB00000800000000000000000000000'
- b) Build DO '97':
DO97 = '970104'
- c) Concatenate cmd_header and DO97:
M = '0CB00000800000000000000000000000970104'

- d) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac} :
 - Increment SSC:
 SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CC'
 - Concatenate padded SSC and M:
 N = '00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CC
 '0CB00000800000000000000000000000
 '970104'
 - Compute MAC:
 CC = '7C564CD2EC22E606'
- e) Build DO'8E':
 DO8E = '8E087C564CD2EC22E606'
- f) Construct command data:
 cmd_data = '9701048E087C564CD2EC22E606'

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'0D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

4. Return 4 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 0:

data = '600D5F01'

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
data	'90'	'00'

- a) Pad data:
 p_data = '600D5F01800000000000000000000000'
- b) Encrypt p_data using AES with KS_{enc} :
 enc_data = 'DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F3455A64AE'
- c) Build DO'87':
 DO87 = '871101DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F345
 '5A64AE'
- d) Build DO'99':
 DO99 = '99029000'
- e) Concatenate DO'87' and DO'99':
 M = '871101DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F345
 '5A64AE99029000'

- f) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac} :
- Increment SSC:
SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CD'
 - Concatenate padded SSC and M:
N = '00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CD
871101DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F345
5A64AE99029000'
 - Compute MAC:
CC = 'CB87EE6B23392361'
- g) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E08CB87EE6B23392361'
- h) Construct response data:
resp_data = '871101DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F345
5A64AE990290008E08CB87EE6B233923
61'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

5. READ BINARY of the remaining 11 bytes:

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'B0'	'00'	'04'	'0B'

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:
cmd_header = '0CB00004800000000000000000000000'
- b) Build DO '97':
DO97 = '97010B'
- c) Concatenate cmd_header and DO97:
M = '0CB00004800000000000000000000000
97010B'
- d) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac} :
- Increment SSC:
SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CE'
 - Concatenate padded SSC and M:
N = '00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CE
0CB00004800000000000000000000000
97010B'
 - Compute MAC:
CC = '98EC6D1082ECDF5F'

- e) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E0898EC6D1082ECDF5F'
- f) Construct command data:
cmd_data = '97010B8E0898EC6D1082ECDF5F'

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'B0'	'00'	'04'	'0D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

6. Return 11 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 4:

data = '04303130305C04616B6567'

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
data	'90'	'00'

- a) Pad data:
p_data = '04303130305C04616B65678000000000'
- b) Encrypt p_data using AES with KS_{enc} :
enc_data = '9D4B6092AEEC6868505D1CFDC112EA0D'
- c) Build DO'87':
DO87 = '8711019D4B6092AEEC6868505D1CFDC112EA0D'
- d) Build DO'99':
DO99 = '99029000'
- e) Concatenate DO'87' and DO'99':
M = '8711019D4B6092AEEC6868505D1CFDC112EA0D99029000'
- f) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac} :
- Increment SSC:
SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CF'
- Concatenate padded SSC and M:
N = '0000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CF8711019D4B6092AEEC6868505D1CFDC112EA0D99029000'
- Compute MAC:
CC = '7A8EA0EDBEA375DA'
- g) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E087A8EA0EDBEA375DA'