
**Guidance on performing risk
assessment in the design of onshore
LNG installations including the ship/
shore interface**

*Recommandations sur l'évaluation des risques dans la conception
d'installations terrestres pour le GNL en incluant l'interface terre/
navire*

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Published in Switzerland

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.

This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 67, *Oil and gas industries including lower carbon energy*, Subcommittee SC 9, *Production, transport and storage facilities for cryogenic liquefied gases*.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/TS 16901:2015), which has been technically revised.

The main changes are as follows:

- reference to IGF code added to the scope;
- references updated in [Clause 2](#) and the bibliography;
- definitions added for HSE critical activity and HSE critical element.

Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user's national standards body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.

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Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship/shore interface

1 Scope

This document provides a common approach and guidance to those undertaking assessment of the major safety hazards as part of the planning, design, and operation of LNG facilities onshore and at shoreline using risk-based methods and standards, to enable a safe design and operation of LNG facilities. The environmental risks associated with an LNG release are not addressed in this document.

This document is applicable both to export and import terminals but can be applicable to other facilities such as satellite and peak shaving plants.

This document is applicable to all facilities inside the perimeter of the terminal and all hazardous materials including LNG and associated products: LPG, pressurized natural gas, odorizers, and other flammable or hazardous products handled within the terminal.

The navigation risks and LNG tanker intrinsic operation risks are recognised, but they are not in the scope of this document. Hazards arising from interfaces between port and facility and ship are addressed and requirements are normally given by port authorities. It is assumed that LNG carriers are designed according to the IGC code, and that LNG fuelled vessels receiving bunker fuel are designed according to IGF code.

Border between port operation and LNG facility is when the ship/shore link (SSL) is established.

This document is not intended to specify acceptable levels of risk; however, examples of tolerable levels of risk are referenced.

See IEC 31010 and ISO 17776 with regard to general risk assessment methods, while this document focuses on the specific needs scenarios and practices within the LNG industry.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO Guide 73, *Risk management — Vocabulary*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO Guide 73 and the following apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <https://www.iso.org/obp>
- IEC Electropedia: available at <https://www.electropedia.org/>

3.1
as low as reasonably practicable
ALARP

reducing a *risk* (3.28) to a level that represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble, difficulty, and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained

3.2
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
BLEVE

sudden release of the content of a vessel containing a pressurized flammable liquid followed by a fireball

Note 1 to entry: This hazard is not applicable to atmospheric LNG tanks, but to pressurized forms of hydrocarbon storage.

[SOURCE: ISO/TS 18683, 3.1.2, modified — Note to entry added.]

3.3
bow-tie

pictorial representation of how a hazard can be hypothetically released and further developed into a number of *consequences* (3.6)

Note 1 to entry: The left-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the fault tree (causal) analysis and involves those threats associated with the hazard, the controls associated with each threat, and any factors that escalate likelihood. The right-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the hazard event tree (consequence) analysis and involves escalation factors and recovery preparedness measures. The centre of the bow-tie is commonly referred to as the “top event”.

3.4
cost to avert a fatality
CAF

value calculated by dividing the costs to install and operate the protection/*mitigation* (3.20) by the reduction in *potential loss* (3.22) of life (PLL)

Note 1 to entry: It is a measure of effectiveness of the protection/mitigation.

3.5
computational fluid dynamics
CFD

numerical methods and algorithms to solve and analyse problems that involve fluid flows

3.6
consequence
outcome of an event

3.7
cost benefit analysis
CBA

means used to assess the relative cost and benefit of a number of *risk* (3.28) reduction alternatives

Note 1 to entry: The ranking of the risk reduction alternatives evaluated is usually shown graphically.

3.8
design accidental load
DAL

most severe accidental load that the function or system is able to withstand during a required period of time, in order to meet the defined *risk* (3.28) acceptance criteria

3.9**explosion barrier**

structural barrier installed to prevent explosion damage in adjacent areas

EXAMPLE A wall.

3.10***F/N* curve****FN**

plot of cumulative frequency versus *N* or more persons that sustain a given level of harm from defined sources of hazards

3.11**failure mode and effect analysis****FMEA**

analytically derived identification of the conceivable equipment failure modes and the potential adverse effects of those modes on the system and mission

Note 1 to entry: It is primarily used as a design tool for review of critical components.

3.12**fatal accident rate****FAR**

number of fatalities per 100 million hours exposure for a certain activity

3.13**harm**

physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or the environment

3.14**hazard**

potential source of *harm* ([3.13](#))

3.15**hazard identification****HAZID**

brainstorming exercise using checklists the hazards in a project are identified and gathered in a *risk register* ([3.39](#)) for follow up in the project

3.16**hazard and operability study****HAZOP**

systematic approach by an interdisciplinary team to identify hazards and operability problems occurring as a result of deviations from the intended range of process conditions

Note 1 to entry: It consists of four steps: definition, preparation, documentation/follow up and examination to manage a hazard completely.

3.17**health, safety and environmental critical activity****HSE critical activity**

activity or task that provides or maintains barriers

3.18**health, safety and environmental critical element****HSE critical element**

component or system whose failure could cause or substantially contribute to the loss of integrity and safety of a system and whose purpose is to prevent or mitigate from the effects of hazards

3.19

impact assessment

assessment of how *consequences* (3.6) (fires, explosions, etc.) do affect people, structures the environment, etc.

3.20

mitigation

limitation of any negative *consequence* (3.6) of a particular event

3.21

Monte Carlo simulation

simulation having many repeats, each time with a different starting value, to obtain distribution function

3.22

potential loss

product of frequency and *harm* (3.13) summed over all the outcomes of a number of top events

3.23

probability

extent to which an event is likely to occur

3.24

probit

inverse cumulative distribution function associated with the standard normal distribution

Note 1 to entry: Probit is used in QRA to describe the relation between exposure, e.g. to radiation or toxics, and fraction fatalities.

3.25

protective measure

means used to reduce risk

3.26

quantitative risk assessment

QRA

techniques that allow the *risk* (3.28) associated with a particular activity to be estimated in absolute quantitative terms rather than in relative terms such as high or low

Note 1 to entry: QRA may be used to determine all risk dimensions, including risk to personnel, risk to the environment, risk to the installation, and/or the assets and financial interests of the company. See ISO 17776:2016, B.12.

3.27

residual risk

risk (3.28) remaining after *protective measures* (3.25) have been taken

3.28

risk

combination of the *probability* (3.23) of occurrence of *harm* (3.13) and the severity of that harm

3.29

risk analysis

systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the *risk* (3.28)

3.30

risk assessment

overall process of *risk analysis* (3.29) and *risk evaluation* (3.33)

3.31**risk contour****RC**

two-dimensional representation of *risk* (3.28) on a map

Note 1 to entry: Also called individual risk contours (IRC) or location-specific risk (LSR).

3.32**risk criteria**

terms of reference by which the significance of *risk* (3.28) is assessed

3.33**risk evaluation**

procedure based on the *risk analysis* (3.29) to determine whether the *tolerable risk* (3.47) has been achieved

3.34**risk management**

coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to *risk* (3.28)

3.35**risk management system**

set of elements of an organization's management system concerned with managing *risk* (3.28)

3.36**risk matrix**

matrix portraying *risk* (3.28) as the product of *probability* (3.23) and *consequence* (3.6), used as the basis for risk determination

Note 1 to entry: Considerations for the assessment of probability are shown on the horizontal axis. Considerations for the assessment of consequence are shown on the vertical axis. Multiple consequence categories are included: impact on people, environment, assets, and reputation. Plotting the intersection of the two considerations on the matrix provides an estimate of the risk.

3.37**risk perception**

way in which a *stakeholder* (3.46) views a *risk* (3.28) based on a set of values or concerns

3.38**risk ranking**

outcome of a qualitative *risk analysis* (3.29) with a numerical annotation of *risk* (3.28)

Note 1 to entry: It allows accident scenarios and their risk to be ranked numerically so that the most severe risks are evident and can be addressed.

3.39**risk register**

hazard management communication document that demonstrates that hazards have been identified, assessed, are being properly controlled, and that recovery preparedness measures are in place in the event control is ever lost

3.40**risk transect****RT**

representation of *risk* (3.28) as a function of distance from the hazard

3.41**rollover**

sudden mixing of two layers in a tank resulting to a massive vapour generation

3.42

rapid phase transition

RPT

explosive change from liquid into vapour phase

Note 1 to entry: When two liquids at two different temperatures come into contact, explosive forces can occur, given certain circumstances. This phenomenon, called rapid phase transition (RPT), can occur when LNG and water come into contact. Although no combustion occurs, this phenomenon has all the other characteristics of an explosion. RPTs resulting from an LNG spill on water have been both rare and with relatively limited consequences (3.6).

3.43

safety

freedom from unacceptable *risk* (3.28)

3.44

SIMOPS

concatenation of simultaneous operations

Note 1 to entry: SIMOPS often refers to events such as maintenance or construction work in an existing plant when there are more personnel near a live operating plant and who are exposed to a higher level of *risk* (3.28) than normal.

3.45

showstopper

event or *consequence* (3.6) that produces an unacceptable level of *risk* (3.28) such that the project cannot proceed and where the level of risk cannot be mitigated to an acceptable level

3.46

stakeholder

individual, group, or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by a *risk* (3.28)

3.47

tolerable risk

risk (3.28) that is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society

3.48

individual risk

probability of being killed (or harmed at certain level) on an annual basis from all *hazards* (3.13)

3.49

potential loss of life

expected value of the number of fatalities per year (or over the life time of a project)

4 Abbreviated terms

ALARP	as low as reasonably practicable
BLEVE	boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
CAF	cost to avert a fatality
CFD	computational fluid dynamics
CBA	cost benefit analysis
DAL	design accidental load
EDP	emergency depressuring

ERC	emergency release coupling
ESD	emergency shutdown
ETA	event tree analysis
FAR	fatal accident rate
FEED	front-end engineering design
FEM	finite element method
FN	frequency vs number (of affected individuals)
FMEA	failure mode and effect analysis
FMECA	failure, modes, effects, and criticality analysis
HAZID	hazard identification
HAZOP	hazard and operability study
HEMP	hazards and effects management process
HSE	health, safety and environmental
IR	individual risk contour
LSR	location-specific risk
LOPA	layers of protection analysis
MTTF	mean time to failure
MTTR	mean time to repair
OBE	operating basis earthquake
PERC	power emergency release coupler
P&IDs	process and instrument diagrams
PIMS	pipeline integrity management system
PLL	potential loss of life
QRA	quantitative risk assessment
RC	risk contour
RPT	rapid phase transition
RT	risk transect
SIL	safety integrity level
SMS	safety management system
SSE	safe shutdown earthquake
SSL	ship/shore link

5 Safety risk management

5.1 Decision support framework for risk management

Safety risk management is integrated in the project development and decision-making processes and need as consistent support for decisions in all phases of an LNG development but does not include the full operational lifecycle.

The approach to risk management should address the project-specific requirements as agreed between the different parties and stakeholders and also establish an agreed format to communicate risk and ensure that decisions are made in a consistent and agreed format through the life of the project.

The acceptance criteria including the format should be defined in conformity with company standards. The format of the acceptance criteria prescribes thereby the approach as discussed below.

There is a wide range of tools and approaches that can be used to support decisions related to risk management. UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) presented a framework for decision support reflecting the significance of the decision as well decision context. The framework as shown for information in [Figure 1](#) illustrates the balancing between use of codes and standards, QRA, and decision processes reflecting company and societal values.




Figure 1 — Decision support framework for risk management

5.2 Prescriptive safety or risk performance

Both prescriptive and risk-based approaches are used in the planning, design, and operation of LNG facilities.

Prescriptive approaches represent industry experience and practices.

The main advantages with prescriptive approaches are predictability and effective decision processes in the design.

The main objections to the use of prescriptive approaches are that they do not accommodate new solutions and thereby can limit novel development and improvement. Further, when the requirements are met, the prescriptive approaches do not encourage a continued effort for further improvements.

Risk-based approaches have developed in the nuclear and offshore industries. Risk-based approaches are used in many parts of the world and are gaining a wider usage.

In essence, risk-based approaches start from first principles aiming at demonstration that the risk acceptance criteria are met with a proper selection of design and operational measures. In principle, no “prescribed solutions” should be given as a starting point (but in reality, good industry experience, practices and standards are adopted as the starting point).

The main advantage of a risk-based approach is that it stimulates new and improved solutions; it encourages continuous focus on improved safety, and it focuses efforts on the key areas as formulated in the risk acceptance criteria.

Normally, a risk-based approach starts early and focuses the attention on the key issues that should be addressed in the different project phases. In most cases, a risk-based approach ensures that the correct decisions are made at the right time and thereby avoids costly revisions and adjustments. Further, the site-specific conditions and particular stakeholder views are better reflected.

The main criticism to risk-based approaches focuses on the complexity of the process, and the line of responsibility can become unclear. It is essential that risk acceptance criteria are established and derived from owner’s requirements. National and international regulations can apply.

It is often found that a risk-based design does not enable all engineering design disciplines to proceed on a firm design basis until the results from the risk analysis is available. This can have a schedule impact.

Further, the uncertainty involved due to, e.g. lack of relevant failure data, model assumptions can make it difficult to relate to the results. A situation where detailed results from sophisticated computational models can generate false confidence in the results can lead to the wrong conclusion. The uncertainty is a particular concern when a risk-based approach is used to demonstrate that sensible safety measures are not needed.

Risk analyses shall not be used to deviate from good engineering practice.

Finally, it is often claimed that the lack of predictability leads to increased cost. But the savings earned by adopting novel solutions can be significant but difficult to quantify.

Successful use of a risk-based approach normally requires an iterative process where the first layouts and decision are based on experience and industry practice (i.e. prescriptive guidelines, standards for process design, etc.) and that this first estimate is qualified and improved using risk-based techniques.

Risk analyses also enable areas and causes of higher risk to be identified so that mitigation measures can be applied in a cost-effective manner.

5.3 Risk assessment in relation to project development

Risk assessment is used for decision support.

The decisions being made in the different phases of a project development vary, and the need for decision support accordingly.

The available information and level of detail as input to any risk assessment increase as the planning progresses. As a result, the requirements to risk assessment techniques and results vary over the project phases, and this can represent a challenge in the communication of the results.

In the early phase of the planning where the key issue is to select business model and technical concept, the main risk activities are to establish risk criteria and safety targets, as well as to demonstrate absence of showstoppers. This requires qualitative approaches.

At this stage of project development, quantitative risk analyses have limited value as no detailed information to describe the facilities are available as input.

In the next phase, the risk assessment should provide quantitative risk information related to the land planning in support of the permitting process.

In later project phases where key issues are the design of mitigation measures, more detailed analyses are appropriate to provide a proper basis for project decisions.

In some jurisdictions, the planning process makes it difficult to modify proposals once they have been submitted to the planning authorities. This makes it difficult to modify the design to reduce risk as detailed engineering develops. This aspect should be considered in project planning.

The requirements, recommendations, and advice given in this document reflect this need. Risk assessment and risk results shall always reflect the following:

- a) the type of decision that shall be made;
- b) effective utilization of available information.

Actions arising from reviews such as HAZID, risk matrix, HAZOP, etc., which are not closed out after the review, should be recorded in a tracking system (for example, a risk register). This should answer that items requiring action at later project stages (i.e. items for operating manuals, etc.) should not be overlooked or forgotten.

This varying level of details in the risk assessment process is illustrated in [Table 1](#) which also is relevant to a wide range of different types of industrial risk assessment.

[Table 1](#) should be used instead of IEC 31010:2019, Table A.1 to identify risk assessment methods. Further description is given in [Clause 7](#).

Table 1 — Typical requirements to risk-related information in different project phases

Project phase	Needed risk related information	Key decisions based on risk assessment	Method of risk assessment within this guideline
Pre-FEED (i.e. Concept selection and business case development)	— Identify stakeholders — Input to the permitting process (demonstrate absence of showstoppers) — Risk criteria — First estimate of the risk level (when required by regulators) — Basic design options — Go-ahead for the development	— Select site — Select concept — Identify and decide risk criteria — Select design criteria — Select design options — Approve continued development	— HAZID — Consequence analyses of major accident scenarios — Prepare risk criteria — Risk communication to legislation and stakeholders

Table 1 (continued)

Project phase	Needed risk related information	Key decisions based on risk assessment	Method of risk assessment within this guideline
FEED Development of basic design	- Focus areas for the design process, i.e. results from HAZID and Consequence analysis - Estimate of the risk level of design options - Basis for selection of an optimized basic design	- Optimisation of the design in terms of safety by comparison of options - Select main technologies - Performance standards for safety system - Confirm concept selection - Authority permit - Decide to start detail design	- Qualitative analysis (risk matrix) - HAZOPs and determination of SIL requirements - QRA - Determine DALs - Detailed consequence assessment - Fire/explosion analysis - Risk communication to legislation and stakeholders
Detail design	- Performance standards for components and systems - Issues to be addressed in the design identified in HAZOP findings incl. SIL requirements - Specifications for buildings and equipment	- Selection of equipment, solutions and operational procedures - Detailed design	- Detailed QRA - Detailed HAZOPs - SIL assessment - Vendor HAZOPs - Evacuation analysis
Commissioning and start-up	- Final results from risk assessment - Confirmation of acceptance according to regulations	- Approve the design - Approve decision to start up	- Completion of risk studies and verification schemes - Commissioning of safety systems - Risk communication to legislation and stakeholders

6 Risk

6.1 What is risk

To be able to express the risk, the consequences shall be defined and the associated probability determined.

Risk is also often referred to as potential loss. The loss or consequence can be loss of life, damage to the environment, assets, or reputation. The probability term is usually expressed as a frequency. In QRAs, the potential loss in general is not calculated from the product of one event and one consequence, but the sum of a large number of frequency and consequence probability combinations.

Risk or potential loss, combination of the probability of an event, and the consequences of the event cannot be readily used as an indicator to decide the tolerability of the risk. It can be used to compare options when all things different between the two options have been evaluated in terms of probability and consequence and included in the assessment.

To be able to use risk in workable concepts, a number of risk indicators have been developed to express risk. These risk indicators are discussed in [6.5](#).

6.2 Safety philosophy and risk criteria

LNG developments are often organized as project organizations (e.g. JV) with international participation. It is therefore important for LNG projects to formulate a safety philosophy and risk criteria based on recognized guidelines/standards in their risk management process (national statutory minimum requirements can apply). This aids the project team in gaining a common terminology, understanding of risk, risk philosophy, and ultimately a common risk management system.

The safety philosophy and risk criteria for the project can address the following categories:

- risk to the population and third-party activities. This has significant impact on the land use and is normally defined by national regulations;
- risk to personnel in the plant. This is normally defined by the company philosophy but can be subject to national regulation;
- risk with respect to material damage and loss of production. The criteria should be defined by the company and are often based on a cost benefit assessment;
- limitations on third-party activity due to hazards arising from the facility.

Examples of the risk criteria required by different authorities are discussed in [Clause A.7](#) and examples of project-specific criteria in [Clause A.8](#).

6.3 Risk control strategy

A widely accepted risk control strategy is the following:

- a) adopt inherently safe design;
- b) prevent – consider measures that will avoid the hazard;
- c) reduce probability of occurrence through design, inspection, maintenance, and working practices;
- d) mitigate consequences – minimize the outcome of an unwanted event;
- e) emergency response – enable returning to a controlled situation.

This can be formalized in the bow-tie methodology as described in [7.2.4](#). The bow-tie is a model that represents how a hazard can be released, escalate, and how it is controlled.

6.4 ALARP

A common approach is to divide risks into three bands:

- a) an upper band where the level of risk is regarded as intolerable whatever benefits the activity can bring, and risk treatment is essential whatever its cost;
- b) a middle band (or “grey” area) where costs and benefits are taken into account and opportunities balanced against potential consequences;
- c) a lower band where the level of risk is regarded as negligible or so small that no risk treatment measures are needed.

The “as low as reasonably practicable” or “ALARP” criteria system follows this approach and is illustrated in [Figure 2](#).




Figure 2 — Risk reduction triangle

ALARP is the process in which all identified options to reduce the risk have been evaluated. A major part of the ALARP process is the documentation of which options have been evaluated and why they have been included in the design or why they have been discarded. The documentation can be consulted when the circumstances change or when the design is challenged in the future. In general, full documentation is only required for high risks and complicated medium risk as it is not reasonable to insist on full documentation for low risk.

The assessment of risk is not an exact science and the techniques used and the experience of the analyst has been shown to produce widely varying result as discussed in studies on uncertainties in chemical risk assessment using a benchmark exercise in 1992 and a 2002 Risø study^[3] about uncertainties in risk analysis of chemical establishments.

The results are evaluated against company or regulatory criteria and there is often a tendency to stop the improvement process when the criteria apparently are satisfied to minimize further capital and manpower expenditure.

The ALARP approach is a conceptual model and there are no boundaries between the three regions. The factors that ultimately decide how a risk is categorized (intolerable, tolerable, or acceptable) are dynamic in nature.

The addition/deletion or modification of mitigation features to just meet the acceptance criteria is strongly discouraged due to the accuracy of the process.

The ALARP process should be continued until the optimum design without incurring excessive cost is achieved. At the conceptual stage, it is often found that risk can be reduced at very low cost.

It is therefore important to start the risk assessment early in the project.

6.5 Ways to express risk to people

6.5.1 General

Risks should be expressed in understandable terms, and the units in which the level of risk is expressed should be clear (see IEC 31010) and reflect the safety criteria as defined by legislation and operator. An example of ways to express risk to people is given in [A.8](#).

A number of risk indicators are used in the LNG industry for risk assessments when relating risk to people. The more commonly used are:

- risk contours (RC);
- risk transects (RT);
- individual risk (IR);
- potential loss of life (PLL);
- fatal accident rate (FAR);
- cost to avert a fatality (CAF);
- F/N curves (FN).

6.5.2 Risk contours (RC)

The risk contour is an ISO risk line overlaid on the site topography at which a hypothetical individual staying there unprotected and for 24 hours per day 365 days per year is subject to a defined probability of harm due to exposure to hazards induced by an activity.




Figure 3 — Examples of risk contours showing predicted risk levels

It is also called location risk and sometimes referred to as individual risk or individual risk contours. An example of a set of risk contours is shown in [Figure 3](#).

Although the hypothetical individual is exposed when the scenario occurs, escape and refuge can be taken into account.

In general, risk contours are calculated by determining the consequences from a number of scenarios. By adapting certain criteria for harm (most often dead) from toxic substances, radiation from fires, and explosion overpressure, effect distances can be determined. Based on incident frequencies and effects from meteorological conditions (wind direction/wind speed/Pasquill stability distribution), the contribution from each scenario to a point at a distance from the activity can now be calculated. By putting a grid over the area surrounding the activity and summing the contribution from all scenarios for each grid point, a three-dimensional (x, y, risk) picture will emerge. Usually, this picture is then reduced to 2D by connecting points of equal risk e.g. 10^{-5} /year, 10^{-6} /year, and 10^{-7} /year.

6.5.3 Risk transects (RT)

Risk transects are similar presentations where the risk contour values or IR/year are plotted versus the lateral distance.

6.5.4 Individual risk (IR)

It is risk to an identifiable person or group with similar exposure patterns.

Sometimes it is calculated by dividing the PLL (which can be over the project life or per year) by the number of people exposed. However, it should be realized that this is averaging the people at high risk levels with the people at low risk levels and therefore is not an IR.

IR should be calculated by following someone for a year and add the different risk contributions like transport, small work, major hazards, etc. Most of these contributions can be calculated using the number exposure hours per year and FAR.

6.5.5 Potential loss of life (PLL)

PLL is a type of risk integral, being a summation of risk as expressed by the product of frequency and consequence (number of fatalities). The integral is summed up over all potential events that can occur. It is mainly used to compare options and enables the inclusion of different risk types like process, transport, workplace hazards, etc. in one number.

6.5.6 Fatal accident rate (FAR)

FAR's for all kind of activities are available in the open literature and are used to calculate the risk contribution from non-major hazards like transport, small work, etc.

6.5.7 Cost to avert a fatality (CAF)

In general, two sets of PLL calculations are done:

- one base-line calculation;
- one with increased protection/mitigation.

CAF is calculated by dividing the costs to install and operate the protection/mitigation by the reduction in PLL.

6.5.8 F/N curves (FN)

Societal risk is often depicted on a cumulative graph called an F/N curve. The horizontal axis is the number of potential fatalities, N . The vertical axis is the cumulative frequency F per year that N or more fatalities could occur. F/N curves are an indicator used by authorities as a measure for social disruption in case of large accidents.

It is normal to take account of protection by buildings and response by people. For large toxic release models, alarm and evacuation can be included. The resulting curve is then the residual risk, should the emergency plans not be effective.

Because it is a cumulative curve, the curve always drops away with increasing N . Usually, the curve has a lower frequency cut-off, e.g. at one in a billion.

Regulators often split the graph into different regions, so that different actions can be undertaken depending on where the F/N curve falls. Sometimes a maximum limit is placed on N .

6.5.9 Uncertainties in QRA

Uncertainties are introduced mainly by the estimation of probabilities and frequencies and, to a lesser degree, by estimating effects and consequences.

When comparing between options, as long as the two options are for a similar operation, the uncertainty is on both sides and tends to cancel it out. On close examination, one often finds that the difference between the two options is in a different exposure caused by, for example, more people.

This often makes marginal differences already significant.

Uncertainty is more of an issue when comparing RC, IR, CAF, and FN with tolerability criteria set by local legislation or by companies for internal use. The calculated RC, IR, CAF, and FN are then compared to absolute values and often the uncertainty is not part of the evaluation.

For this reason, it is recommended to do sensitivity calculation by changing the various parameters like failure rates, ignition probabilities, etc.

7 Methodologies

7.1 Main steps of risk assessment

The main steps in a risk assessment can be summarized to identify the following:

- what can go wrong? (hazard identification);
- what is the effect? (consequence and impact assessment);
- what is the likelihood? (frequency assessment);
- is the risk preventable/can it be eliminated? If not, is the risk tolerable, and should risk reduction/mitigation measures be implemented?

This sequence of steps avoids the requirement to perform a detailed frequency assessment for hazards having insignificant consequences.

The main methodologies used in risk assessment in the different project phases are given in IEC 31010 and ISO 17776 and as listed in [Table 1](#).

7.2 Qualitative risk analysis

7.2.1 HAZID

The complexity and diversity of LNG facilities lead to inability to comprehensively identify potential major hazards and operability difficulties within process plant design and operation intuitively. Techniques are therefore required to systematically list these hazards in a detailed, structured, and methodical manner. The HAZID is a technique used for early identification of potential hazards and threats. It is also suited to the identification of non-process related hazards such as ship collision, dropped objects, extreme weather, etc. The effect or possible consequence of an untoward incident is itemized and the possible causes determined.

The HAZID technique is a

- means of identifying and describing occupational HSE hazards and threats at the earliest practicable stage of a development or venture,
- meeting employing a highly experienced multi-discipline team using a structured brainstorming technique, based on a checklist (see [Clause A.4](#)) of potential HSE issues, to assess the applicability of potential hazards, and
- rapid identification and description process only, not a forum for trying to solve potential problems.

A common HAZID meeting organisation should involve a facilitator supported by experienced representatives from process design, safety engineering, operations, marine specialist if required, and instrument engineering. Other specialist should be available “on call”.

[Figure 4](#) presents the methodology of a HAZID workshop. The structure of the workshop should reflect the purpose of the review. The review of arrangements and safeguards for process facilities will normally be structured according to the process flow (i.e. compression, inlet separation, pretreatment, etc.).

Once hazards, consequence, and safeguards are identified, risk ranking is carried out and recommendations are made to overcome or improve the hazards. The process of risk ranking is normally performed using a risk matrix which is further discussed in [7.2.3](#).




Figure 4 — Process during a HAZID workshop

The HAZID shall produce a list of recommendations and an action plan. This action plan addresses each recommendation developed along the HAZID meeting and shall be tracked (for example, via a risk register) for its assessment and implementation.

A typical HAZID workshop is normally recorded with the following:

- activity ID;
- function;
- failure mode;
- failure mechanism/cause;
- system failure effect;
- consequence category (e. g. people, environment, assets, reputation);
- consequence (ranked according to risk matrix being used);
- likelihood (ranked according to risk matrix being used);
- criticality (low, medium, or high);
- action items identified;
- comments.

7.2.2 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)

The definition of failure mode and effect analysis is an analytically derived identification of the conceivable equipment failure modes and the potential adverse effects of those modes on the system and mission. It is primarily used as a design tool for review of critical components.

Further details are given in IEC 31010:2019, B.2.3 and ISO 17776:2016, C.11.

7.2.3 Risk matrix

The risk matrix is an effective tool for qualitative risk assessment and screening. It is normally used in workshops in support of HAZIDs and FMEA. It can be used during the following quantitative analysis (see 7.3 and 7.4). The results from the detailed analysis in terms of frequency and consequences can be reported in the matrix. This enables to track and tune the efficiency of the risk-reducing measures, qualify initial assumptions, and confirm the initial scenario ranking.

An example of a risk matrix is shown in Figure 5.

Consequence					Increasing probability			
Severity rating	People	Assets	Environment	Reputation	A	B	C	D
					Has occurred in E&P industry	Has occurred in operating company	Occurred several times a year in operating company	Occurred several times a year in location
0	Zero injury	Zero damage	Zero effect	Zero impact	Manage for continued improvement			
1	Slight injury	Slight damage	Slight effect	Slight impact				
2	Minor injury	Minor damage	Minor effect	Limited impact				
3	Major injury	Local damage	Local effect	Considerable impact	Incorporate risk-reducing measures			
4	Single fatality	Major damage	Major effect	Major national impact				
5	Multiple injury	Extensive damage	Massive effect	Major international impact				
					Fail to meet screening criteria			

Figure 5 — Example of a risk matrix

The risk matrix should reflect the company, national and international regulations and practices.

7.2.4 Bow-tie

The bow-tie is a design tool that can be used to assess barriers to prevent occurrence of top events and recovery measures to reduce the consequences. It is based on a model that represents how a hazard can be released, escalate, and how it is controlled. Figure 6 shows the bow-tie diagram.




Figure 6 — Bow-tie diagram

The bow-tie model provides for the assessment of hazards in order to:

- identify the potential hazard release, escalation, and consequence scenarios;
- identify the controls (i.e. barriers and escalation factor controls) required to effectively manage these hazards, (e.g. the HSE critical elements, HSE critical activities, and procedures);
- support the ALARP demonstration;
- provide visibility and communicate the above information to those responsible for managing, or who can be affected by the hazards;
- in the event of an incident, have the ability to relate causes of incidents to the controls that failed, thus enabling improved incident learning and prevention.

A barrier is the common term for controls, recovery measures, and escalation factor controls that prevent a threat from being released and then causing the consequences. Barriers prevent or reduce the probability of each threat or prevent, limit the extent of, or provide immediate recovery from the consequences. Barriers to the left of the top-event in the bow-tie are preventive measures. Barriers to the right of the top-event are recovery measures.

Barriers can be for example:

- design features (e.g. separation distances);
- hardware (e.g. pressure relief valve, fire detection);
- processes (e.g. lock out/tag out);
- operational intervention tasks (e.g. plant monitoring/shutdown);
- combination (e.g. alarm plus operator action).

An adequate set of barriers to manage each threat shall be identified. For a barrier to be valid, it shall be:

- effective in preventing the top-event or consequence;

- able to prevent a specific threat from releasing the hazard;
- verifiable (e.g. through audit of the HSE critical activity needed to maintain an effective barrier);
- independent of the other barriers within the same threat line.

The application of the “bow-tie” depends on company and national regulations representing acceptance criteria and practices.

The barriers are counted from the threat to the consequence. [Table 2](#) gives an example on the required numbers to demonstrate ALARP. If the required number of barriers in [Table 2](#) cannot be met, layers of protection analysis (LOPA, IEC 31010:2019, B.4.4) should be used.

Table 2 — Required number of barriers to demonstrate ALARP

Barriers	High risk hazards	Medium risk hazards with potential fatalities	Other medium risk hazards
Total number of barriers from threat to consequence	5 controls + recovery measures	4 controls + recovery measures	3 controls + recovery measures
Controls (threat)	3 controls to be in place for each identified threat. Alternative: 4 controls	2 controls to be in place for each identified threat. Alternative: 3 controls	2 controls to be in place for each identified threat
Recovery measures (consequence)	2 recovery measures required for each identified consequence. Alternative: 1 recovery measure	2 recovery measures required for each identified consequence. Alternative: 1 recovery measure	1 recovery measure required for each identified consequence

In most instances, a barrier only is counted as one. An experienced hazard analyst with experience in using LOPA can give a barrier additional credit based on the LOPA tables. For example, for a protective instrument system that is a SIL 2, which gives a probability of failure on demand between 10⁻² and 10⁻³, can be counted as two barriers.

7.2.5 HAZOP

The HAZOP is suitable for identifying hazards associated with deviations from the design intent of the LNG terminal. It draws upon the facility process and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) as the basis of the study and is used more as an audit tool once the design is well understood and minor changes to the system can be incorporated easily. HAZOP is a vertical thought process with only one or two simultaneous failures, whereas HAZID is a lateral thought process which can result from a number of simultaneous failures.

HAZOPs are used to identify both hazards and operability problems. Although hazard identification is the main focus, operability problems are also identified to the extent that they may have the potential to lead to safety or environmental hazards, or have a negative impact on plant profitability. The HAZOP team involves a group typically consisting of operators, designers, technical specialists (both external and internal to the design team), and maintainers focussing on specific portions of the process called “nodes”. These sections are defined from the P&IDs prior to the study. A process parameter is identified, e.g. flow and then typical guidewords are then applied to the specified sections to identify possible deviations (e.g. a guideword “no” is combined with the parameter “flow” to create a deviation, “no flow”). The team then lists all the credible causes of a “no flow” deviation beginning with the cause that can result in the worst possible consequence.

HAZOP is applicable during the basic design (FEED), when P&IDs are issued, as well cause-effect matrix has been produced. It is usually carried out during the detail design as well and may even be reapplied during a management of changes.

The typical outputs of a HAZOP analysis include the following:

- identification of possible deviation states;
- identification of the possible causes for deviation;
- probable worst-case scenarios;
- documentation of existing safeguards;
- action required to reduce risk;
- allocation of action to an individual or group.

Figure 7 presents the methodology of a HAZOP workshop.




Figure 7 — Process during a HAZOP workshop

Further details are given in IEC 31010:2019, B.2.4

7.2.6 SIL analysis

Safety integrity level (SIL) analysis as described in the IEC 61508 series complements the HAZOP analysis and the risk assessment study by defining the level of confidence required from the instrumented safety systems including mechanical devices and software, intended to prevent hazardous situations affecting safety of persons and/or the environment or to mitigate their consequences.

The IEC 61508 series also introduces the notion of safety life cycle that aims to secure the reliability of the implemented safety systems throughout the life of the system.

The SIL assessment should be based on layers of protection analysis (see the IEC 61508 series).

7.3 Quantitative analysis: consequence and impact assessment

7.3.1 General

Quantitative risk analysis requires the use of numerical models. Validated models should be used when available.

7.3.2 Consequence assessment

7.3.2.1 Consequence models

A wide range of computational tools are available to assess the consequences from accidental events comprising both empirical tools and tools developed from the basic physical equations. The burning characteristics depend strongly on the type of fuel (natural gas, LPG) and shall be reflected in the assessment.

The consequence models should be validated by the following:

- taking into account the physical phenomena observed in, and with the data obtained from, available experimental data;
- having been published in an archival, peer-reviewed scientific journal in the related scientific/engineering discipline;
- providing output details of the physics and analysis.

The most important categories are listed in [Table 3](#) below.

Table 3 — Categories for consequence models

	Empirical models	Models based on solving physical equations
Liquid spreading and vaporizing gas dispersion	Gaussian, plume, and dense gas models	CFD
Fire	Thomas formula, jet fire, or pool fire models	CFD Heat transfer models for fire radiation.
Explosion	A number of commercial packages available, energy correlations	CFD
Structural damage	Engineering tools, Minorsky's energy based correlation for assessment of impact damage	FEM and classical mechanics.

CFD models are gaining acceptance in gas dispersion, fire, and explosion analysis for complex situations. These models offer an accurate representation of the flow mechanics. However, it is important to keep in mind that the quality of the results depends upon model assumptions and inclusiveness of physical/chemical processes more than the number of significant digits or the appearance of the graphical presentations.

7.3.2.2 Fluid properties

Hazardous material properties used for the calculation should be clearly defined in particular:

- the composition of the release material;
- the thermo-physical properties of the release material;
- the flammability limits of the released material, i.e. the proportion of combustible gases in a mixture, between which this mixture is flammable.

For LNG properties, see EN 1160 or the range of natural gas compositions expected in the plant.

7.3.2.3 Evaporation of spilled flammable material

The assessment of evaporation of flammable gases from a pool of spilled liquids is based on the following:

- the determination of the pool propagation speed;
- the calculation of the rate of evaporation versus time and, in particular, the maximum evaporation rate.

The factors to be defined are the following:

- a) phenomenon of instantaneous vaporisation (flash);
- b) nature and temperature of the surface (water, soil, concrete, etc.);
- c) ambient conditions (temperature, humidity, wind velocity, stability class).

First evaluation for LNG can be based on evaporation rates. The evaporation rates can be described by theories of the pool spreading and vaporisation models that have been verified with experimental data. These theories are normally imbedded in commercial software tools.

7.3.2.4 Gas dispersion

The assessment of gas dispersion shall determine the zone affected by a cloud extension of flammable material. The extent of the zone is given by the distance from the source to the flammability limit for the gas. Normally, 0,5 LFL is used to account for model uncertainty.

The factors to be defined are the following:

- a) Ambient conditions: the ambient conditions are often described by the Pasquill stability classes. The Pasquill method gives a break-down of the amount of atmospheric turbulence present as follows:
 - 1) A: extremely unstable;
 - 2) B: moderately unstable;
 - 3) C: lightly unstable;
 - 4) D: neutral;
 - 5) E: lightly stable;
 - 6) F: moderately stable.
- b) Wind speed, direction, and frequency (the wind rose).
- c) Relative humidity of the atmosphere.
- d) Influence of terrain and obstacles.

Dispersion analysis is normally carried out for selected accident scenarios reflecting local conditions.

It should be noted that the safety distances as a result of gas dispersion can be different depending on regional requirements (see NFPA 59A and EN 1473)

7.3.2.5 Thermal radiation

The assessment of thermal radiation shall determine the risk due to thermal radiation by calculation of the radiation contours caused by ignition of flammable material from a pool or jet by determination of the radiant heating effects on the exposed targets.

The following factors are to be defined:

- a) source configuration (pool dimensions, flame size, and shape, etc.);
- b) target configuration versus the radiation source (distance, elevation);
- c) target reflectance properties;
- d) emissive power of the flammable material;
- e) ambient temperature;
- f) relative humidity;
- g) wind speed, direction, and frequency (the wind rose).

7.3.3 Impact assessment

Impact can be defined as the damage to life, health, or property. Damage can take many forms. Most used are loss of life, irreversible health effects, and loss of money.

Regulations require the assessment of fixed values be given to which impact to personnel. For example, NFPA recommends 5 kW/m² for fire radiation and EN 1473 recommends range of allowable values applicable for areas with different vulnerability (e.g. lower allowable radiation in outside public areas of 1,5 kW/m²)

For risk-based assessment, impact for personnel has to be evaluated as described in the next subclauses, which give guidance on the impact on human beings and equipment from fire, and explosion. Toxics, in general, do not feature in LNG operations. Main use of the information is guidance for QRA rule sets (which often are referred to as probits).

Fire radiation

The assessment of fire radiation shall determine the radiative heat flux received by different targets (people buildings, etc.) in case of fire.

The assessment shall take into account the following:

- position from the source;
- ambient conditions;
- emissivity of the source.

The impact criteria contained in this subclause relate to the thermal radiation outcome. The physical effects of thermal radiation on humans are most relevant in the immediate vicinity of an incident. The progressive effects resulting are as follows:

- pain;
- first-degree burns;
- second-degree burns;
- third-degree burns;
- fatality.

These effects are commonly linked to the intensity of the incident thermal radiation and [Table A.1](#) provides the typical consequences of exposure to various levels of intensity and the expected time to each effect. Values have been approximated to reflect uncertainty in calculation and represent “cautious best estimate” values.

Flash fires

Any people caught in an ignited, dispersing flammable cloud may result in serious injuries or fatalities. In practice, people inside the LFL dispersion cloud zone are assumed to result in casualties.

Explosions

People can survive fairly strong blast waves and in accidents involving explosion there are very few cases in which the blast effect has directly caused fatality. Typical injuries/fatalities following an explosion are caused by burns, flying fragments, buildings, or other structures falling down or being disintegrated and persons falling or "flying" and subsequently hitting a solid object (whole body displacement).

In risk analysis, the most important effects are the following:

- flying fragments hitting personnel;
- whole body displacement resulting in impact damage;
- damage from impact caused by collapsed structures.

7.4 Quantitative analysis: frequency assessment

7.4.1 General

The frequency part of the risk assessment is trying to determine how often things go wrong with the potential to result in damage, injuries, or fatalities. A number of tools are available.

7.4.2 Failure data

Relevant failure data for components exposed to LNG operation is available at OREDA Handbook^[23].

The relevance of existing failure data is often disputed because the experience does not fully reflect the operational conditions and component design. The lack of relevant data can tempt the assessor to use data that are not applicable to the issue at hand. Typical examples are using general pump leak data for canned pumps or double flushed seal pumps.

However, in spite of the lack of failure data for similar components in similar situations, there are strong arguments for using available failure data as explained below:

- all components shall be fit for purpose;
- design requirements, quality control and maintenance represent the safety net to ensure that the component is fit for purpose;
- a failure occurs when the control and procedures in place to ensure "fit for purpose" fails.

Failure data being used in risk assessments should always be referenced and be auditable.

Failure data may be derived from experience database as explained in [Clause A.3](#). These are data gathered all over industry. Based on the number of incidents and the number of equipment items in operation, an incident frequency can be established.

7.4.3 Consensus data

Consensus data based on discussion and agreement among experienced personnel can be used when no data are available. By interviewing a group of people with relevant experience, meaningful incident frequency data can be developed. However, the methodology can only be used for event frequencies which have an occurrence of at least once every three years to five years. For lower frequencies, the group should be large and it is questionable whether there are that many people at your disposal with the relevant experience.

7.4.4 FAULT tree

A fault tree is an analysis of those events in a process that can result in particular malfunctions or failures, shown in the form of a tree diagram. Fault trees are very useful in simple systems like instrumentation where they are used quite often (see SIL). For complex systems like it is more complicated; e.g. trying to work out the leak frequency of a particular type of tank is riddled with pitfalls. The main problem with fault trees is that it is very difficult to identify all the contributors to the failure and to recognize common mode failures. Errors in both lead in general to a too low a failure frequency. In general, the equipment fails more often than calculated. As they are also very time consuming, their use should not be encouraged.

A fault tree diagram is usually written out using conventional logic gate symbols ("And" and "Or"). The route through a tree between an event and an initiator in the tree is called a cutset. The shortest credible way through the tree from fault to initiating event is called a minimal cutset.

Fault trees can be used to illustrate the contribution from the various part of a system. For example, a fire-fighting system can highlight the contribution from the firewater pumps, deluge valves, and detection. The effectiveness of adding additional detection or fire water pumps can be illustrated using fault trees.

Further fault trees can be used to assess the effects of mitigation measures (redundancy, inspection, maintenance) on failure frequencies of components and systems.

Further details are given in IEC 31010.

7.4.5 Event tree analysis (ETA)

An event tree is a graphical way of showing the possible outcomes of a hazardous event, such as a failure of equipment or hydrocarbon release. An ETA explores the possible outcome of the initial event and determines the resulting frequencies of the different end events which represent different consequences. As such, the event tree is a logical tool to aggregate probabilities and risks.

The branch probabilities determine the distribution of the top events and reflect protective barriers that are enforced to reduce risk. For example, the ignition probability for a hydrocarbon release is lower if the leak has been detected and electrical systems being shut down. And therefore an event tree can be used to assess the efficiency of different mitigating measures by doing comparative studies by variation of the branch probabilities reflecting the different mitigations.

Further description is given in IEC 31010.

7.4.6 Exceedance curves based on probabilistic simulations

The normal approach to risk assessment is to assess the consequences and probabilities for representative accidental scenarios defined by given parameters (e.g. release size, weather and wind conditions, activation of safety systems after a defined delay) resulting in a few point values, because of the limited number of scenarios. When there are only a few variables this is not a problem. However, when the variables are many like in explosions, then it is difficult to present the results in a meaningful manner.

An alternative approach is to characterize the different parameters as a distribution and use a probabilistic simulation, e.g. by Monte Carlo analysis.

An example from a Monte Carlo simulation of explosion pressures is shown as an exceedance curve in [Figure 8](#) (exceedance curves are, for example, defined in NORSOK-Z013). The variation in overpressure reflects the variance in important factors:

- size of the releases;
- location of release;
- effects of weather conditions;

— point of ignition.

The results from the simulation are a huge number of frequency/overpressure pairs. These are ordered on overpressure and the frequency plotted versus overpressure as shown in [Figure 8](#).




Figure 8 — Sample result of probabilistic explosion modelling

The graph can now be used to estimate how frequently a value is exceeded, e.g. to decide on strength of explosion barriers, buildings, or structures.

7.5 Risk assessments (consequence*frequency)

7.5.1 Risk assessment tools

The aggregation of consequence and frequency into risk can be done simply in a tabular format, but in most cases, a computerized model is used to handle the large number of risk contributors.

The outputs from these risk assessment tools shall be verified, whether by hand calculations, benchmarks, and other test bed verifications.

These risk assessment tools fall generally into two groups: ad hoc developed and proprietary.

7.5.2 Ad hoc developed risk assessment tools

Ad hoc QRA models are usually based on modelling with multi-layer spreadsheets. These multiple sheets typically contain the following:

- a count of the number and type of components in the plant;
- a table of failure rate data for each component size and type;
- a table of consequence distance (i.e. distance from hazard source at which fatality or injury potentially occurs) for each type and size of failure;
- a sheet with a wind rose with time-based delimitations relevant to vapour cloud dispersion directions;
- a table of occupancy numbers and percentage exposure values for occupied areas of the site.

By multiplying these elements together and summing the results on an area basis, the risk of a fatality in a grid of plant areas can be determined.

Advantages of the spreadsheet method

The calculation methods and steps can be traced from step to step so that the internal working of the model can be reviewed and understood at any given time.

Modifications to the spreadsheet logic can be easily achieved by a skilled risk practitioner.

As the model is transparent, inspection of the model shows quickly the events that contribute most of the risk and whether these “higher risks” are due to the number of hazard sources, the frequency of release the “fatality distances” that the hazards have, and the numbers of people exposed to the risk. The visibility of these factors allows judgement to be applied in how to reduce risk levels if they are too high.

Disadvantages of the spreadsheet method

It requires a QRA Engineer with considerable knowledge of QRA methodology and significant spreadsheet programming ability to build the model.

The models are often large and complex and difficult to check properly.

The control of changes to the model is difficult without a rigorous check and approval procedure.

The maintenance of spreadsheet models can be difficult as original authors move on if the spreadsheet is not fully documented.

Developers of spreadsheet models often prefer not to have integrated consequence models to avoid excessive complexity and often use a curve fit from a range of results from other consequence modelling programs. A change in a plant parameter may need a new set of consequence curves need to be built which is time consuming.

7.5.3 Proprietary risk assessment tools

Proprietary models have been developed by companies often to assist them with their own consultancy work and subsequently made available to the industry. They are usually the fruits of years of research and have been subject to thorough checking of their modelling methods and internal calculation methods.

They are usually subject to updates by the software support team.

Advantages of proprietary models

Some models include failure rate data based on the company's own failure rate data base. This can be an advantage as failure rate data have always been difficult to obtain.

Other programs provide a framework in which the user can place their own failure rate data.

Proprietary risk assessment models often sit above a proprietary consequence modelling program which is often available in its own right. This makes the software sensitive to changes in the design and these can be incorporated quickly.

Disadvantages of proprietary models

The model is a “black box”. If it behaves in an unusual or unpredictable way, it is usually difficult to understand what is going on inside the “box”.

Some changes can come about as the underlying consequence modelling “engine” moves from one calculation algorithm to another as parameters vary. This characteristic gives the user no support if challenged by a customer over the output from the program or a change in the output as a result of a parameter changing slightly.

8 Accident scenarios

8.1 Overview accident scenarios

Identification of accident scenarios are an essential part of any risk assessment.

The accident scenarios that are studied in a risk assessment are generally identified as part of a hazard identification session.

This clause presents typical accident scenarios that should be considered and that could have an impact on the design and layout of the installation.

The scenarios result in the release of flammable material for which the consequences to be analysed have already been mentioned in [7.3](#).

Typical scenarios for LNG facilities comprising release of all types of hydrocarbons (including refrigerants and natural gas liquids) and other scenarios that should be considered for detailed assessment are listed in [8.2](#). There are the general scenarios that apply to all hydrocarbons containing equipment. These have been supplemented with scenarios that are LNG specific and might be overlooked by personnel without in-depth familiarity with LNG plants.

Other accident scenarios that should be considered for export terminals are presented in [8.3](#).

The development of the accident scenarios for hydrocarbon releases including escalation are shown in [Annex B](#). Possible domino effects should be addressed not only within the terminal but also the impact on the surroundings and impact of the surrounding facilities on the terminal.

In general, QRA are designed to model the operation of the facilities. However, simultaneous operation, major construction/maintenance in or near process areas in operation should be part of the risk assessment.

Security assessment, e.g. vulnerability to terrorist attack, are not considered here and should be the subject of a specific study.

8.2 LNG import facilities including SIMOPS

Typical possible accidental releases of flammable material for LNG import terminal are listed in [Table 4](#) including the possible source of release scenario and examples of the initiating event.

Table 4 — Typical accident scenarios for LNG import facilities

Source of release	Scenario	Possible causes
General process and cargo handling	Accidental release from equipment and piping	Flange tightness
		Defective gasket
		Weld defects
		Corrosion
		Impact
		Supporting structure damage
		External fire
		Overpressure (e.g. pressure tests during commission)
		Embrittlement
		Earthquake
		Other natural hazards
Accidental release from LNG carrier tanks at jetty ^a	Ship collision	Passing ship adrift
	Ship pressure relief valve	Overpressure
		Rollover
Jetty	Damage to piping	Ship colliding with jetty or trestle
	Loading arms leak/rupture	Ship movement, ERC/PERC failure
		List (loss of ballast)
		Extreme weather
		Line failures
		Swivel joint failure
		Pressure surge during transfer
		External fire
		Earthquake
	RPT LNG spills	Spill of LNG into water
Storage	Tank roof collapse	Tank overfilling
		Tank overpressure
		Rollover
		Flying object
	Tank	Fire damage
	Tank leakage	Dropped in tank pump
		Internal/external leak tank bottom/wall
		Earthquake

^a Hazards related to ship approach and manoeuvre into the harbour are assumed to be addressed in a specific study.

Table 4 (continued)

Source of release	Scenario	Possible causes
	Tank PSV release	Tank overfilling
		Tank overpressure
		Rollover
	BLEVE	Fire impact on pressurized hydro-carbon containers.
	Tank leakage from N ₂ tanks	Internal/external leak tank bottom/wall Earthquake
	Leaks from tank piping/manifolds	See general
Process	Recondenser leak/rupture	Overpressure
	S&T exchangers/ plate fin exchangers leak/rupture	Pipe rupture
		Overpressure
		Defective gasket
	LNG vaporizers leak/rupture (incl. intermediate fluid: propane, methanol)	Pipe rupture
		Overpressure Overpressure
	Pipe rupture	Overpressure (LP/HP boundary)
		Pressure surge during unloading
		Pressure surge LP/HP send-out lines
		Cold breakthrough (vaporizers)
Utilities	Flare and or vent release	Overpressure export gas line
		Surge control
LNG trucking	Releases during transfer	Rupture of transfer hoses or piping. Operational errors
^a Hazards related to ship approach and manoeuvre into the harbour are assumed to be addressed in a specific study.		

8.3 LNG export facilities

Typical possible accidental releases of flammable material for LNG export terminal are given in [Table 5](#) where the possible source of release scenario and the initiating event are also listed.

Table 5 — Typical accident scenarios for LNG export facilities

Source of release	Scenario	Possible causes
General applicable to all parts of the facilities	Accidental release from equipment and piping	Flange tightness
		Defective gasket
		Weld defects
		Corrosion
		Impact
		Supporting structure damage
		External fire
		Overpressure (e.g. pressure tests during commissioning)
		Embrittlement
		Earthquake
		Other natural hazards
Slug catcher and receiving	Escalation from fires	Ignited leaks
Conditioning	Spillage of fat solvent	See general
	Pressurized liquid spills in fractionation	See general
Liquefaction	BLEVE of refrigerant	External fire
Storage	BLEVE of refrigerants	External fire
	Tank roof collapses	Tank overfilling
		Tank overpressure
		Rollover
		Flying object
	Tank leakage	Dropped in tank pump
		Internal/external leak tank bottom/wall
		Earthquake
	Tank PSV release	Tank overfilling
		Tank overpressure
		Rollover
Jetty	Damage to piping	Ship colliding with jetty or trestle
	Loading arms leak/rupture	Ship movement, ERC/PERC failure
		List (loss of ballast)
		Extreme weather
		Line failures
		Swivel joint failure
		Pressure surge during transfer
		External fire
		Earthquake
	RPT LNG spills	Spill of LNG into water
Utilities	Hot oil fires	See general

9 Standard presentation of risk

Risk assessments are being used to support decisions. It is therefore essential that the results from a QRA are presented to ensure the following:

- The risk picture including compliance/noncompliance with acceptance criteria is communicated to and understood by decision makers and other stakeholders.
- That risk-reducing measures and recommendations are clearly presented and understood by decision makers.
- That methodology, assumptions, and data are described in sufficient detail to enable traceability and possible modifications. The study shall be auditable and traceable.
- This requires that the results are presented and communicated in a consistent way reflecting acceptance criteria and legislation, project decision criteria, and company philosophies.

The minimum content of a QRA report is outlined by the following table of contents:

1. Executive summary
2. Description
3. Study methodology
4. Hazard/Top event ID
5. Flammable and toxic release scenarios
6. Other hazards
 - i. Transport
 - ii. Structural
7. Risk presentation
8. Sensitivity studies
9. Results and Discussion
10. Conclusions and Recommendations
11. Appendices
 - i. System layout
 - ii. Assumptions register
 - iii. Frequency data
 - iv. Consequence modelling results
 - v. Action follow-up register

The documentation of input data, model assumptions, and selection of models should enable verification and modifications, such that the results can be reconstructed.

Annex A (informative)

Impact criteria

A.1 Accident impact criteria

A.1.1 Thermal radiation

[Table A.1](#) presents the effects of thermal radiation on humans and structures.

Table A.1 — Effects of thermal radiation (Ref: UK HID SPC/Tech/OSD30)

Thermal radiation kW/m ²	Effect on humans	Effect on structures
1,2	Received from the sun at noon in summer.	
2	Minimum to cause pain after 1 min.	
<5	Will cause pain in 15 s to 20 s and injury after 30 s exposure.	
>6	Pain within approximately 10 s rapid escape only is possible.	
12,5	Significant chance of fatality for medium duration exposure.	Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach thermal stress level high enough to cause structural failure.
25	Likely fatality for extended exposure and significant chance of fatality for instantaneous exposure.	Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure. Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress temperatures that can cause failure.
35	Significant chance of fatality for people exposed instantaneously.	Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one minute exposure. Concrete walls will spall.

A.1.2 Overpressure

People can survive fairly strong blast waves and in accidents involving explosion, there are very few cases in which the blast effect has directly caused fatality. Typical injuries/fatalities following an explosion are caused by burns, flying fragments, buildings, or other structures falling down or being disintegrated and persons falling or “flying” and subsequently hitting a solid object (whole body displacement). In risk analysis, the most important effects are the following:

- flying fragments hitting personnel;
- whole body displacement resulting in impact damage;
- damage from impact caused by collapsed structures.

Data for explosion effects on personnel for use in QRAs are given in References [19] and [22].

A.2 Simple risk calculations

Simple risk calculations are often useful to support decisions, particularly in the early stages of a development when the information required to do a full QRA do not exist. An example of such calculations is given below:

The event tree in [Figure A.2](#) is an element of a single risk analysis. It develops the risk at an occupied target location 100 metres from a single release scenario on the plant.

The intent is to illustrate a possible calculation mechanism that can be used. All the figures are fictional.

The example can be expanded to include other release and hazard scenarios and other target distances and directions and other atmospheric conditions as shown in [Figure A.1](#).

These can then be aggregated to produce levels of risk overlaid on a geographic mesh around the plant.

A risk contour plot can be produced from the mesh of risk values.

When an event tree model such as [Figure A.2](#) is used, the maximum values that dominate aggregates risk levels at particular points can be identified. This allows mitigation measures to be beneficially focused on particular hazards.

Further information and similar event trees are given in IEC 31010.




Figure A.1 — Wind rose for simple risk assessment

	Hole size	Gas ignited at source	Jet fire length	Can jet fire reach target	Is leak directed at target	Vapour cloud dispersion distance	Can flammable vapour reach target	Is wind blowing towards target	Ignition probability at target	Occupancy Risk calculator	Event risk
	Probability	Probability	Distance to target	Probability	Probability	Distance to target	Probability	Probability	Probability		
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
Methane leak	1 mm	Yes	5 m	No	Yes					Yes	$=A \times B \times D \times E \times J$
	1,00E-03	0,9	100 m	0	0,25					0,33	0,00E+00
		No				50 m	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	$=A \times B \times G \times H \times I \times J$
		0,1				100 m	0	0,15	0,9	0,33	0,00E+00
	5 mm	Yes	5 m	No	Yes					Yes	$=A \times B \times D \times E \times J$
	1,00E-04	0,9	100 m	0	0,25					0,33	0,00E+00
		No				110 m	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$=A \times B \times G \times H \times I \times J$
		0,1				100 m	1	0,15	0,9	0,33	4,46E-07
	100 mm	Yes	150 m	Yes	Yes					Yes	$=A \times B \times D \times E \times J$
	1,00E-05	0,3	100 m	1	0,25					0,33	2,48E-07
		No				200 m	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$=A \times B \times G \times H \times I \times J$
		0,7				100 m	1	0,15	0,9	0,33	3,12E-07
											Total Risk 1,00E-06

Figure A.2 — Sample event tree for a simple risk assessment

A.3 Failure data

The frequency at which failures can occur in a system or equipment item is usually modelled through an exponential failure distribution that can be defined by a unique parameter, called failure rate, that is constant over time. In that case, the failure rate, noted λ , is linked with the mean time to failure (MTTF) of equipment items with the following relationship:

$$MTTF = 1 / \lambda$$

The failure rate is usually given “per year”, but other units may also be encountered (ex: “per hour”).

How to derive the information within an incident database into failure rates or MTTF is another issue all together as often the confidence of probabilistic failure calculations depends heavily upon the dependability of good failure data. One should use the best available data to estimate the equipment or systems failure and therefore should have data from a large panel of sources in order to ensure the most appropriate data are used. Additionally, a thorough understanding of how information is presented in the incident database is an important factor for obtaining dependable results.

Derivations of incident data into failure rates can include the following:

- a listing of failure modes whose criticality may be broken down into incident groups;
- the cause of failure may also be available and should be listed;
- the observed number of failures for each failure mode is calculated;
- the total population of the equipment item or system and the number of facilities it appears on;
- the total time in service of the equipment item or system in terms of calendar time, operational time, and the total number of demands;
- the uncertainty range of the failure rates of each failure mode;
- the mean time to failure (MTTF) estimate;

- the mean time to repair (MTTR) estimate.

Doing this, a number of factors should be taken into account. For instance, reflecting the clean service of a system should incorporate modifying the failure rate to remove the downtime (associated with equipment failures) of certain failure modes. The population should also be taken into account to ensure an adequate range of data are analysed.

Ideally, the equipment failure frequency is estimated using data that has been collected from similar equipment that has been exposed to similar conditions – process, environment, maintenance, etc. In practice, this will usually not be possible. Differences in the history of equipment can limit the applicability of the generic data. In practice, a judgment should be made trading-off the availability and applicability of generic data.

However, when possible and additional resources can be assigned, it is often preferred to determine failure rate data using techniques such as a failure, modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) especially for novel or improved systems or equipment.

A FMECA study normally takes a group of operational personnel and steps through a system assessing individual equipment items as to the types of failure modes and the overall effect of failure on production. Apart from important reliability data in terms of MTTFs and MTTRs of equipment items, information on the criticality of equipment is determined (i.e. if this valve fails, will it fail safe? Will it cause an impact on production?).

See References [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28] and [29] on failure rate data of equipment items.

- OREDA Handbook[23] contains data for use in reliability, availability, and maintainability studies - failure rates, failure mode distribution, and repair times for equipment;
- CCPS Process Equipment Reliability Database. The database is only open to CCPS members but some data are available in Reference [25].

Some sources of data specific to LNG equipment items exist (see Reference [29]) but they are of a limited practical use in a risk assessment. Therefore, the main information mostly comes from the oil and gas industry and the chemical industry.

Failure data also include leak frequency data, which allows to estimate the probability of leaks of various sizes on pipes and equipment items (e.g. valves, pumps). These data can be derived from incident databases or expert judgment as well.

See References [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38] and [42] for further information on leak frequency data.

It should be noted that there are no publicly available incident databases for LNG plants that can be available to derive leak frequencies and therefore should rely on the above more general data.

A.4 List of hazards to be considered (reflecting experience data)

General HAZID checklist as in [Tables A.2](#) to [A.5](#) can be found in many sources, e.g. ISO 17776:2016, Annex B.

Table A.2 — HAZID checklist, external and environmental hazards

External and environmental hazards		
Hazard type	Guideword	Expanders
Natural hazards	Extreme weather	Temperature extremes
		Waves
		Wind
		Dust
		Flooding
		Sandstorms
		Ice
		Snow
		Blizzards
		Fog
		Fast atmospheric pressure changes
	Lightning	
	Climate change	
	Seismic activity	Earthquake
		Soil liquefaction
	Erosion	Ground slide
		Coastal erosion
		Riverbank erosion
	Subsidence	Ground structure
		Foundations
External and third-party hazards	Third party activities	Settlement
		Farming
		Fishing
	Helicopter/Aircraft crash	Local industry
Human error	Ship collision	
	Operator	
	Maintenance	
	Inspection	

Table A.3 — HAZID checklist, facility hazards

Facility hazards		
Hazard type	Guideword	Expanders
Process hazards	Process releases (LNG) — Unignited	Gas clouds
		Cryogenic spills
		Gas detection
		Emergency response

Table A.3 (continued)

Facility hazards		
Hazard type	Guideword	Expanders
	Ignited process releases (natural gas)	Fire
		Explosion
		Heat
		Smoke
		Fire detection
		Emergency response
	Ignited process releases (LPG, refrigerants, and other hydrocarbons with different burning characteristics than natural gas)	BLEVE
		Fire
		Explosion
		Heat
		Smoke
		Fire detection
		Emergency response
	Process releases — toxic	Toxic gas detection Emergency response
	Flaring	Heat Ignition source Location
	Venting	Discharge to atmosphere Location Dispersion
	Draining	
	Sampling	Operator error
Accommodation and non-process area hazards	Non-process fires	Control rooms Accommodation
	Smoke ingress	Ingress to safe areas HVAC shutdown
	Gas ingress	Ingress to safe areas HVAC shutdown
	Stacking and storage	

Table A.4 — HAZID checklist, health hazards

Health hazards		
Hazard type	Guideword	Expanders
Health hazard	Disease hazards	Endemic diseases
		Infection
		Contaminated water/food
		Social, e.g. HIV
Working environment	Physical	Drinking water
		Lighting
		Noise
NOTE Hazards specific to LNG facilities not addressed in general checklists.		

Table A.4 (continued)

Health hazards		
Hazard type	Guideword	Expanders
	Temperature	Extreme hot/cold
		Ventilation
		Guarding
		Cold burns
	Atmospheres	Exhaust fumes
		Confined spaces
NOTE Hazards specific to LNG facilities not addressed in general checklists.		

Table A.5 — HAZID checklist, additional LNG and LPG hazards

LNG and LPG hazards		
Hazard type	Guideword	Expanders
Process Hazard	Storage	Roll-over
	Temperature	Metal embrittlement
		Temperature shock
		High thermal strain gradient
Shipping	Transfer	RPT

A.5 Risk assessment with respect to earthquake

In international LNG plant design codes, two concepts of earthquake design criteria are used. These are the following:

- OBE, operating basis earth-quake. This is the maximum earthquake for which no damage is sustained and restart and safe operation can continue after examination of the plant.
- SSE, safe shutdown earthquake. This is the maximum earthquake event for which the essential fail-safe functions and mechanisms are designed to be preserved. Permanent damage can be expected of this lower probability event, but without loss of overall integrity and containment. The installation will not remain in continuous service without a detailed examination and structural assessment at the ultimate limit state.

When a plant is not designed to the relevant national earthquake requirements incorporating OBE and SSE principles, it can be necessary to include risk arising from earthquake in the risk evaluation.

A.6 Safety management

A.6.1 General

The risk assessment of any facility is based on the assumption that the plant is operated and maintained in a systematic way by qualified personnel.

As a consequence, a fundamental assumption for the risk assessment is that procedures and programs for training, maintenance, and operation exist and are implemented. This subclause addresses basic recommendations.

During engineering and construction, safety should be continuously scrutinized to guarantee the appropriate safety level with regard to the hazard assessment.

The safety management, after design and construction, should include design considerations and continuous reviews. Thus, QRA represents a tool to provide identification, priorities, and guidance to develop operational documents and instructions concerning risk management.

For that reason, preparation for plant operation should tackle the following points:

- development of plant operation, maintenance, and inspection procedures (operational procedures);
- personnel training;
- development of safety procedures, which integrate with the overall port emergency procedures [and international ship and port facilities security (ISPS) code, where relevant].

The Code of Practice for LNG Facilities^[47], and EN 17649 may be referred to.

A.6.2 Operational procedures

After operations and activities associated with hazards are identified, the implementation of documented procedures is necessary to manage the risks and to cover situations where their absence can lead to hazardous situations.

In addition, it is recommended to implement and maintain some controls, such as:

- operational controls, as applicable to the organization and its activities;
- controls related to purchased goods, equipment, and services;
- controls related to contractors and other visitors to the workplace.

The safety management system (SMS) should include documents to ensure the effective planning, operation and control of processes that relate to the management of its OH&S (occupational health and safety) risks (proportional to the level of complexity, hazards and risks concerned, and kept to the minimum required for effectiveness and efficiency).

Regarding the safety control system, it should be designed and operated in accordance with requirements of the IEC 61508 series or IEC 61511. SIL requirements should be studied and evaluated to be consistent with the required plant safety level.

The ESD signal processor should be SIL 2 or better.

A.6.3 Maintenance procedures

Each LNG terminal operator should have written maintenance procedures based on experience, knowledge of similar facilities, and conditions under which the facilities will be maintained.

Each LNG terminal operator should prepare a written manual that sets out an inspection and maintenance program for each component that is used in the facility.

The maintenance manual for facility components should include the following:

- The manner of carrying out, and the frequency, of the inspections and tests on every component and its support system in service in the facility, to verify that the component is maintained in accordance with the equipment manufacturer recommendations, and in accordance with the IEC 61508 series for what concerns safety integrity levels.
- A description of any action that is necessary to maintain the facility in safe conditions.
- All procedures to be followed during repairs on operating components while they are being repaired, to ensure safety of people a property at the facility.

Each facility operator should conduct the maintenance program in accordance with the written manual for facility components.

A.6.4 Training

The plant should be operated in a safe efficient manner compliant with national health and safety legislation.

Operating practices and procedures should be compliant with relevant requirements, e.g. the requirements of the local major accident prevention regulations, and the safety management system.

It should be ensured that any person developing tasks that can impact on health and safety is competent on the basis of appropriate education, training, or experience.

Training needs should be identified in order to provide training or take other actions to meet these needs and evaluate the effectiveness of the training or action taken. Specifically, people engaged in any of the terminal activities should be trained in the hazards and properties of LNG with particular attention to emergency response procedures.

Operation and maintenance staff should be trained in all aspects of their work to ensure that they can work in a safe and competent manner under both normal and emergency condition. Initial training should take into account the background of the individual. Re-training should be undertaken at regular intervals and all records of training be kept.

For management and staff training, schemes should be structured according to the individual experience, duties, and responsibilities within the organisation and should be independently validated.

All people visiting a site for whatever purpose should be instructed in the hazards and properties of LNG; the depth to which this training is undertaken should be appropriate to the level of involvement in site operations.

A.6.5 Emergency for worst case scenarios

The terminal operator is obliged by legislation to take all necessary measures to prevent major accidents and to limit their consequences for people and the environment.

It should be required that the operator draws up a document setting out his major-accident prevention policy and ensures that it is properly implemented. The major-accident prevention policy established by the operator should be designed to guarantee a high level of protection for people and the environment by appropriate means, structures, and management systems.

Prior to starting operation, it should be ensured that the operator draws up an internal emergency plan, including the measures to be taken inside the establishment, to supply to the competent authorities the necessary information to enable them to draw up external emergency plans.

The emergency plans shall be established with the objectives of:

- containing and controlling incidents so as to minimize the effects, and to limit damage to people, the environment and property;
- implementing the measures necessary to protect people and the environment from the effects of major accidents;
- communicating the necessary information to the public and to the services or authorities concerned in the area;
- providing for the restoration and clean-up of the environment following a major accident.

A.7 National regulations

This clause gives basic principles criteria and/or main requirement that are of application for risk assessment studies in varied countries of the world, based on the versions available in 2011.

The reported information does not pretend to be exhaustive and only aims at illustrating with examples different requirements in definition of safety philosophy and risk criteria. The examples listed below shall not be reproduced/considered in an actual project. For an actual project, refer to the full details of the current regulation.

Tables A.6 to A.14 give some information from some regulations, listed in alphabetical order.

Table A.6 — Regulations in Australia

Australia	Risk-based
New South Wales	
ID/Reference	New South Wales Department of Planning
Risk contour for land use planning	Hospitals, schools, child care, and elderly care facilities should be outside the 5×10^{-7}/yr contour. Residential developments including hotels and tourist resorts should be outside the 10^{-6}/yr contour. Commercial developments, offices, warehouses, and restaurants should be outside the 5×10^{-6}/yr contour. Sporting complexes and active open areas should be outside the 10^{-5}/yr contour. Industrial sites neighbouring hazardous sites should be outside the 5×10^{-5}/yr contour.
Societal	
Other	
Comments	
Australia	Risk-based
Western Australia	
ID/Reference	A number of Hazardous Industry Advisory Papers and other guidelines have been issued by the New South Wales Department of Planning with risk criteria for hazardous installations. They are based on risk contours.
Risk contour for land use planning	A risk level in residential zones of one in a million (10^{-6}) per year or less is so small as to be acceptable. A risk level in “sensitive developments”, such as hospitals, schools, child care facilities, and aged care housing developments, of between one half and one in a million per year is so small as to be acceptable. Risk levels from industrial facilities should not exceed a target of 50 in a million per year (5×10^{-5}) at the site boundary for each individual industry and the cumulative risk level imposed upon an industry should not exceed a target of one hundred in a million per year (10^{-4}). A risk for any non-industrial activity, located in buffer zones between industrial and residential zones, of 10 in a million (10^{-5}) per year or lower is so small as to be acceptable. A risk level for commercial developments, including offices, retail centres, and show-rooms located in buffer zones between industrial facilities and residential zones, of five in a million (5×10^{-6}) per year or less is so small as to be acceptable.
Societal	
Other	
Comments	

Table A.7 — Regulations in Canada

Canada	Prescriptive
ID/Reference	CSA Standard Z276

Table A.7 (continued)

Description
The storage tanks and process equipment must be sited so that the radiation from a fire will not have an effect on the surrounding area. Meteorological data from the site must be used in this analysis. The standard defines the acceptable radiation levels for risk to personnel and facility.
Likewise, the LNG containment facilities are required to conform to guidelines, and the facility must calculate the effect of an LNG spill and ensure that the effect from any vapor cloud remain on the facility site.
Comments
Design parameters for storage tanks, process equipment, instrumentation, piping and fire protection are defined in the national standard, and the guidelines must be followed before a facility is issued an operating permit.
Operation, maintenance, and personnel training also have guidelines which must be followed by a facility.
The Canadian standard is reviewed continuously to ensure that the guidelines it contains are consistent with current safe practices and industry standards.

Table A.8 — Regulations in France

France	Risk-based
ID/Reference	
Description	
French authorities require safety reports for hazardous installations since 1976, now under European Seveso II regulations (LNG terminals are top tier Seveso establishments).	
The methodology moved from a purely deterministic approach to a mixed probabilistic-deterministic approach since 2003. It makes use of scenario-based, probabilistic analysis for risk acceptability and land-use planning. However, external emergency planning is not based on a probabilistic analysis (every event that is “physically possible” must be studied).	
The safety report presents risk results in an official risk matrix, with 3 risk levels, used by the authorities to form a judgement about the acceptability of the risks created by the LNG terminal and the need for additional risk reduction measures.	
The land-use planning is based on the definition of aggregated risks (with French specific aggregating rules) creating numerous types of impacted areas with more or less stringent constraints on land use and activity.	
Comments	
There is no F-N curve or Risk Contour presentation in the Safety report.	
Scope of safety report includes LNG carrier while unloading. Maritime and nautical risks associated with LNG carrier while in port are included in the safety report prepared by the Port authority.	

Table A.9 — Regulations in Hong Kong

Hong-Kong	Risk-based
ID/Reference	A set of Risk Guidelines (RG) has been adopted by CCPHI (Coordinating Committee on Land-use Planning and Control relating to Potentially Hazardous Installations) to assess the off-site risk levels of PHIs (Potentially Hazardous Installations). These guidelines are expressed in terms of individual and societal risks.
Risk contour for land use planning	The CCPHI individual RG requires that the maximum level of off-site individual risk associated with PHIs should not exceed 1 in 100 000 per year i.e. 1×10^{-5} /year.
Societal	Two FN risk lines are used in the societal RG to determine “acceptable” or “unacceptable” societal risks. In order to avoid major disasters resulting in more than 1 000 deaths, there is a vertical cut-off line at the 1 000 fatality level extending down to a frequency of 1 in a billion years. An intermediate region is also incorporated in the societal RG in which the acceptability of societal risk is borderline and should be reduced to a level which is “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP). It seeks to ensure that all practicable and cost-effective measures which can reduce risks will be considered.
Other	

Table A.9 (continued)

Comments	
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Table A.10 — Regulations in Japan

Japan	Prescriptive
ID/Reference	LNG terminal must be designed and installed according to the designated laws and regulations. The designated laws and regulations are the nongovernmental guidance issued by the Japan Gas Association. The guidance is specific for LNG.
Description	Physical effects model give the relationships between the distance and effects. The further away the less the consequences. Therefore, certain threshold values are set for the effect to decide on distance. The threshold values are set based the extent of damages. a) Radiation heat from pool fire The level of damage by radiation heat is determined by the dose (combination of intensity and exposure time) on a human body. For a long duration fire like a pool fire, the permissible limit of radiation is around 2,324 kJ/m ² s (2,000 kcal/m ² h). b) Flash fire Radiation effects from flash fires are, in view of the short duration, negligible. People caught in the flammable range, between 1/2 LFL and 2*LFL, will be affected. c) Explosion Suitable threshold values should be set before executing the risk assessment. According to the Japanese High-Pressure Gas Safety Law and Safety Regulation for Plant Complex, the limit value of blast pressure = for new installation is set to 9,800 Pa (0,1 kgf/cm ²) and a certain distance is to be secured.
Comments	

Table A.11 — Regulations in Malaysia

Malaysia	Risk-based
ID/Reference	The criteria used by the Department of Environment (DOE) for existing facilities are outlined below.
Risk contour for land use planning	Residential 1×10^{-6} fatalities/person/year Industrial 1×10^{-5} fatalities/person/year
Societal	
Other	
Comments	If the quantified individual risk compares favourably with the acceptability criteria, then it is deemed acceptable. If not, the components of the overall risk are re-examined to determine where risk mitigation measures can be implemented cost effectively. Risk evaluation must also be done in the light that hazard analyses and consequence assessment only gives an estimation of risks from a facility. Therefore, as a safety factor, a standard quantitative risk assessment technique is always to err on the conservative in assumption making.

Table A.12 — Regulations in Netherlands

Netherlands	Risk-based
ID/Reference	Biscuit externe veiligheid inrichtingen ^[41]

Table A.12 (continued)

Risk contour for land use planning	Vulnerable objects are divided in two classes. Legally binding end points apply. The first group accounts hospitals, schools, and residential areas; for these objects, a risk tolerability threshold of 10^{-6} event/year applies. The second group accounts less vulnerable objects as industrial zones, office buildings, or recreational facilities. For these facilities, a tolerability threshold of 10^{-5} event/year applies.
Societal	The definition of societal risk (SR) as the chance, for a number of people $>N$, to die as a direct consequence of their presence in the vicinity of a dangerous facility in which an accident occurs; non-binding tolerability end points apply. The acceptability criteria for an accident are 100 times stricter for every expected ten-fold in number of victim (i.e. the acceptability of a disaster with 10 lethal victims is set on 10^{-5} event/year, for a disaster with 100 lethal victims 10^{-7} event/year, etc.).
Other	
Comments	QRAs are performed using standard scenarios, consequence models, and impact criteria. A computer program called SAFETI-NL with a tight limited degree of freedom is used to ensure consistent results.

Table A.13 — Regulations in Singapore

Singapore	Risk-based
ID/Reference	Environmental Pollution Control Act
Risk contour for land use planning	that the 5×10^{-6} IR contour extends into industrial developments only that the 1×10^{-6} IR contour extends into commercial and industrial developments only
Societal	—
Other	That the following hazard zones/IR contour for credible scenarios are within the plant site boundary: — 37,5 kW/m² heat radiation hazard zone; — 5 psi explosion overpressure hazard zone; — 5×10^{-5} per year IR contour. Hazard zones (IDLH, 3 % fatality, 4 kW/m², 500TDU, 0,5 psi, fireball zone). That the hazard zones for the worst credible scenario (WCS) does not extend into residential areas. No high-rise developments within the fireball zone.
Comments	

Table A.14 — Regulations in the United Kingdom

United Kingdom	Risk-based
ID/ Reference	The “Control of Major Hazards” or COMAH regulations are in line with the latest EU “Seveso-2” Directive COMAH. PADHI
Risk contour for land use planning	The methodology within PADHI requires that three concentric zones are established around the installation termed the inner, middle, and outer zones. The outermost edge of the outer zone is the “consultation distance” (CD). The size of these zones can vary significantly from site to site, depending on the type of installation under consideration. Similarly, the method by which the zone sizes are established depends on the type of site. For some sites a “risk-based” approach is used, whereby the zone boundaries correspond to different values of the risk of an individual receiving a “dangerous dose” or worse. A dangerous dose is considered to cause all of the following effects to an exposed population: